Could European Governance Ideas Improve Federal-provincial Relations in Canada? EDAP 6/2013 by Wood, Donna E.
 
       
 
European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 
EDAP 06/2013 
 
 
 
 
Could European Governance Ideas 
Improve  
Federal-provincial Relations in Canada?  
 
 
Donna E. Wood  
 
 
 
 
  
www.eurac.edu/edap 
 
 
Managing editors: 
Emma Lantschner / Francesco Palermo / Gabriel N. Toggenburg 
 
 
Editorial Board: 
In alphabetical order:  
Florian Bieber (Uiversity of Graz, A) 
 
Craufurd Smith Rachel (University of Edinburgh, UK) 
Dani Marco (Università di Trento, I) 
De Witte Bruno (European University Institute, I) 
Gamper Anna (Universität Innsbruck, A) 
Henrard Kristin (University of Rotterdam, NL) 
Hoffmeister Frank (Free University of Brussels, BE) 
Kujovich Gil (Vermont Law School, US) 
Kymlicka Will (Queens University, CAN) 
Marko Joseph (Universität Graz, A) 
Nic Shuibhne Niamh (University of Edinburgh, UK) 
Packer John (United Nations Department of Political Affairs) 
Pallaver Günther (Universität Innsbruck, A) 
Poggeschi Giovanni (Università di Lecce, I) 
Sasse Gwendolyn (London School of Economics, UK) 
Tarr G. Alan (Rutgers University, US) 
Teachout Peter (Vermont Law School, US) 
Toniatti Roberto (Università di Trento, I) 
Williams Robert F. (Rutgers University, US) 
Woelk Jens (Università di Trento, I) 
 
Assistant to the Managing editors: 
Verena Wisthaler 
   
 
Europäische Akademie Bozen 
Drususallee, 1 
39100 Bozen – Italien 
Tel. +39 0471 055200 
Fax +39 0471 055299 
edap eurac.edu  
www.eurac.edu/edap  
  Accademia Europea Bolzano 
Viale Druso, 1 
39100 Bolzano – Italia 
Tel. +39 0471 055200 
Fax +39 0471 055299 
edap eurac.edu  
www.eurac.edu/edap  
 
 
 
Copyright Information: 
Any  sort  of  reproduction –  including  excerpts  – is  permitted  only 
when indicating the exact EDAP source. Please quote EDAP as indicated in 
the following example: Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “The Debate on European 
Values  and  the  Case  of  Cultural  Diversity”,  1  European  Diversity  and 
Autonomy Papers– EDAP (2004), 10, at www.eurac.edu/edap.   Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap    edap@eurac.edu 
Abstract 
 
Over  the  past  seventeen  years  Canada  has  decentralized  many  social 
programmes, moving responsibility from the federal government to 13 provinces 
and territories through bilateral federal-provincial agreements. In contrast, the 
European Union (EU) has moved in the opposite direction, building pan-European 
approaches and establishing new processes to facilitate multilateral collaboration 
among the 28 EU member states. This has been done through a new governance 
approach called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Using a detailed case 
study  −  employment  policy  −  this  paper  explores  whether  Canada  could  learn 
from OMC governance ideas to re-build a pan-Canadian dimension to employment 
policy and improve the performance of its intergovernmental relations system. 
Concrete lessons for Canada to improve decentralized governance are suggested: 
consolidating the different bilateral agreements; using benchmarking instead of 
controls in fiscal transfers; undertaking research, analysis, and comparisons in 
order to facilitate mutual learning; revitalizing intergovernmental structures in 
light  of  devolution;  and  engaging  social  partners,  civil  society  and  other 
stakeholders. Post-devolution Canada is not doing badly in managing employment 
policy,  but  could  do  better.  Looking  to  the  EU  for  ideas  on  new  ways  to 
collaborate provides a chance for setting a forward looking agenda that could 
ultimately  result  not  only  in  better  labour  market  outcomes,  but  also 
improvements to one small part of Canada’s often fractious federation.  
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Could European Governance Ideas Improve  
Federal-provincial Relations in Canada?  
Donna E. Wood  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Federal-provincial  relations  in  social  policy  in  Canada  have  changed 
dramatically over the past seventeen years. Fiscal arrangements have been 
recast,  with  the  cost-sharing  levers  of  the  past  replaced  with  block  or 
conditional transfers. Many policy areas ─ for example social assistance and 
labour market ─ that once had a significant federal dimension are now the 
prime responsibility of provincial governments, with programmes shaped and 
reformed to suit each province’s particular needs and circumstances. Federal 
leadership  has  diminished,  with  limited  guarantees  that  Canadians  will 
receive  similar  programmes  from  one  province  to  another.  Unilateral, 
bilateral, interprovincial or regional approaches to social policy governance 
are increasingly chosen as pan-Canadian, multilateral collaborative solutions 
are viewed as either unnecessary or unattainable.  
In  contrast,  over  the  past  decade  the  European  Union  (EU)  has  been 
building  substantially  closer  ties  in  social  policy,  with  member  states 
increasingly  bound  together  in  an  ever-evolving  quasi-federal  governance 
structure. Initially formed in 1950 with six nations, the European Union has 
step by step, area by area, put institutional structures and processes in place 
to  facilitate  joint  decision  making,  cooperation  and  collaboration  as  an 
alternative to conflict and war.
1 In the EU the logic of ever -closer economic 
integration  has  compelled  member  states  to  also  strive  for  greater 
coordination of their social policy efforts. But here member state autonomy 
trumped their willingness to give the EU -level more powers, resulting in the 
development  of  a  new  form  of  governance  ─  the  Open  Method  of 
Coordination  (OMC)  ─  as  a  way  of  setting  European-wide  goals  while 
respecting differences among member states. This EU governance approach ─ 
adapted now to govern relations between 28 member states ─ has particular 
salience  when  searching  for  mechanisms  to  facilitate  multilateral 
collaboration  between  Canada’s  often  fractious  14 
federal/provincial/territorial governments.  
 
 
1   Ingeborg Tömmel and Amy Verdun, Innovative Governance in the European Union: The Politics of 
Multilevel Policymaking. (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2009) Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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The purpose of this paper is to systematically compare Canadian and EU 
approaches  to  employment  policy2  governance. Not only is this the policy 
domain where the OMC governance approach is the most highly developed in 
the EU, it is also the area where over the past seventeen years Canada has 
significantly  decentralized.  While  a  number  of  Canadian  authors  have 
suggested that Canada look to the EU for governance ideas through the OMC
3, 
to date no detailed comparison in a defined policy area has been undertaken. 
This assessment of employment policy gove rnance  –  focused  primarily  on 
activities in 2010/11− is meant to begin to fill that gap. 
A qualitative, comparative case-study methodology was used to undertake 
the  research.  On  the  European  side  20  individuals  living  in  Europe  were 
interviewed  in  London  and  Brussels  in  the  fall  of  2010  ─  five  European 
Commission officials, six member state officials, two Canadian officials, and 
seven individuals representing business, unions, academia and civil society. 
Information relating to European programming was also obtained through a 
review  of  government  documents  and  European  Commission  reports  easily 
accessible on public websites, plus a review of the vast secondary literature 
on  the  OMC.  In  Canada  more  than  50  interviews  were  undertaken  with 
Canadian federal and provincial policy-makers and stakeholders ─ mostly in 
Ottawa, Alberta and New Brunswick ─ in the course of various projects done 
between  2003  and  2011.  In  addition,  government  reports,  websites  and 
secondary sources were reviewed.  
This  working  paper  assumes  that  readers  have  a  basic  knowledge  or 
understanding  of  Canadian  federalism  and  European  integration  and  the 
power dynamics in each.4 Part 2 provides an overview of employment policy 
in Canada and the European Union and the key parameters of each system. 
Part 3 describes and compares in pragmat ic detail the tools and techniques 
used  to  facilitate  coordination  and  collaboration  across  their  constituent 
units. Part 4 assesses whether OMC approaches might be transferred to the 
Canadian context. Part 5 concludes. 
 
 
2   The analysis is scoped to focus on programs that assist people to prepare for, find, and keep a job 
and that assist employers to secure the staff they need. Employment standards or health and safety 
at work are not examined.   
3   Jane Jenson, “Canada's New Social Risks: Directions for a New Social Architecture”, Canadian Policy 
Research  Networks  2004,  at  http://www.cprn.org/documents/31815_en.pdf.  Denis  Saint-Martin, 
“Coordinating  Interdependence:  Governance  and  Social  Policy  Redesign  in  Britain,  the  European 
Union and Canada”, Research Report No. F/41, Social Architecture Series, Canadian Policy Research 
Networks  2004,  at  http://www.cprn.ca/doc.cfm?doc=716&l=en.  Bruno  Théret,  “Canada’s  Social 
Union in Perspective: Looking into the European Mirror”, in Sarah Fortin, Alain Noel and France St-
Hilaire  eds.),  Forging  the  Canadian  Social  Union:  SUFA  and  Beyond,  (Montreal,  Institute  for 
Research on Public Policy, 2003). Peter Graefe, Julie Simmons and Linda White, Understanding and 
Evaluating  New  Intergovernmental  Accountability  Regimes:  Canada  in  Comparative  Perspective, 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2010). 
4   For  more  information  on the Canada-EU comparison, 56(2) Canadian Public Administration June 
2013  dedicates  an  entire  issue  to  comparing  Canadian  and  EU  approaches  to  social  policy 
governance. Included in this is an analysis of employment policy extracted from this working paper. 
An earlier version of this research appeared as a policy paper on the website of the Canada-Europe 
Transatlantic  Dialogue  in  August  2011,  see  http://labs.carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/CETD-Brief-Using-European-Governance-Ideas-August-26-final.pdf  Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap    7  edap@eurac.edu 
 
2. Historical Perspective  
2.1 Devolution in Canada 
There is no mention of labour market policy in the division of powers under 
the British North America Act, and hence from the country’s beginning both 
federal  and  provincial  governments  have  been  involved.  Provincial 
governments  are  responsible  for  education  (including  training)  and  social 
services  (including  last  resort  social  assistance).  Although  the  federal 
government  has  responsibility  for  overall  macro-economic  policy,  post-
confederation  most  policy  instruments  relating  to  human  resource 
development were considered to be under provincial jurisdiction. As a result, 
the  various  employment  centres,  labour  exchanges,  relief  measures,  and 
vocational  and  technical  education  programmes  established  before  the 
Second  World  War  were  set  up  by  provinces  and  supported  by  federal 
conditional grants.
5 
Over time, these provincially delivered employment services came under 
increasing criticism, with failings attributed mostly to divided jurisdiction and 
joint administration. There was also federal-provincial wrangling over federal 
relief funds. Concerned over the mobility of labour and capital in a federal 
state, pressure built on the federal government to intervene directly in the 
labour  market.  However,  it  took  the  extraordinary  conditions  of  the 
Depression and the inability of cash strapped provinces and municipalities to 
provide adequate relief to the unemployed to convince provinces and all 
political parties to agree to a constitutional amendment to the British North 
America Act.6 By the end of the 1930s, all provinces had agreed to strengthen 
federal  jurisdiction  in  labour  market  policy  to  allow  the  Government  of 
Canada to run a  contributory  Unemployment Insurance (UI) scheme and a 
national  employment  service.  At  the  time,  it  was  felt  that  these  two  
functions  were  inextricably  linked,  with  an  efficient  employment  service 
providing the foundation for the Unemployment Insurance scheme.7  
In the 1950s and 1960s the federal unemployment insurance  programme 
was  expanded.  At  the  same  time  the federal gover nment also began to 
develop  active  measures  for  individuals  who  were  not  eligible  for 
unemployment insurance, such as youth, aboriginal persons, older workers, 
recent immigrants and others. Over time many provinces also started to offer 
 
 
5   John, Hunter, “The Employment Challenge, Federal Employment Policies and Programs 1900-1990”, 
Public Affairs, Government of Canada, 1993. 
6   In 1933, nearly a quarter of the country’s labour force was unemployed and an estimated 15 
percent of the population were on some form of relief (Banting, 2005: 97).  
7   This interpretation has recently been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, which in 
Confederation des syndicats nationaux vs. the Attorney General of Canada on December 11, 2008 
confirmed that active employment measures fall within the legislative authority of the Government 
of Canada. See http://lexisnexis.ca/documents/Arvida-en.pdf. Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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active  measures  using  provincial  funding,  perceiving  gaps  in  federal 
programming  or  a  need  to  strengthen  areas  of  importance  for  provincial 
economic  growth.  Of  particular  concern  was  to  ensure  access  to  active 
measures  for  a  growing  provincial  social  assistance  caseload.  This 
responsibility was not transferred to the federal government with the  1940 
constitutional amendment.  
As a result, a patchwork of programmes arose. Some provinces (especially 
Québec and Alberta) actively disputed federal leadership in the policy domain 
because they viewed labour market training as an extension of their head of 
power related to education. In 1996 Ottawa agreed to devolve responsibility 
for active measures for Employment Insurance (EI) clients to provincial and 
territorial  governments.  It  has  taken  over  14  years  for  devolved  Labour 
Market Development Agreements (LMDAs) to be signed with all jurisdictions. 
When  the  federal  Conservatives  assumed  power  their  2007  federal  budget 
outlined a new labour market training architecture that “clarified roles and 
responsibilities and recognized that provinces were best placed to design and 
deliver this [labour market] programming”.
8 They also provided new funding 
to support employment programmes for people not in receipt of EI benefits, 
and offered to exp lore the feasibility of transferring federal youth, older 
worker and disability programming.
9 The first two promises have since been 
fulfilled. There has been no action to date on the promise to transfer 
programming for other client groups. 
Active employment measures in Canada today are a combination of federal 
and provincial programmes,10 some charged to the Employment Insurance (EI) 
account (funded solely by employer and employee contributions) and some 
funded through federal general tax revenues. Province s also dedicate an 
undetermined amount of own-source provincial resources to these activities. 
This varies from one province to another depending on the priority placed on 
the policy domain and the size of the social assistance caseload. 11 In 2011/12 
annual  federal  funding  allocations  to  employment  programmes  were 
estimated  at over $3.4 billion Cdn  (€2.5b), of which $2.8 b Cdn (€1.95) is 
managed by the provinces. Eighty per cent of federally-funded programmes 
are  provincially  designed  and  delivered,  10  per  cent  are  under  aboriginal 
administration,  and  10  per  cent  are  under  sole  federal  control. 
Notwithstanding devolution, the pan-Canadian institutional mechanisms that 
bring governments together on active measures remain the same. The Forum 
of Labour Market Ministers (FLMM) set up in 1983 and then formalized in 1993 
 
 
8   Canada. Department of Finance, Budget 2007: Aspire to a Stronger, Safer, Better Canada. 2007, at 
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2007/plan/bptoc-eng.html, 4. 
9   Donna Wood and Tom Klassen, “Bilateral Federalism and Workforce Development Policy in Canada” 
52(2) Canadian Public Administration 2009, 249-270. 
10   Unlike many European countries local governments in Canada (except in Ontario) do not manage or 
deliver employment or social services programs.  
11   It is noteworthy that there are more social assistance (SA) recipients requiring employment supports 
- estimated at 1.2 million (Stapleton 2011) - than there are Employment Insurance recipients, 
(648,960) (Statistics Canada 2010).  Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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to promote federal–provincial cooperation on labour market issues remains 
virtually  unchanged,  with  a  modest,  rotating,  provincially  managed 
secretariat.  Figure  1  presents  a  picture  of  current  federal-provincial 
arrangements  in  Canada,  including  related  provincial-only  and  federal-only 
programming. This analysis focuses on the middle part of the diagram. 
 
Figure 1: Federal-provincial Arrangements for Labour Market Programmes in Canada Post-
Devolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On balance, policy-makers in provincial and federal governments in Canada 
interviewed  feel  relatively  satisfied  with  the  new  arrangements  that  they 
have  put  in  place.  They  believe  that  devolution  has  improved  the 
effectiveness of labour market programming and that provincial governments 
(and  their  regional  and  local  offices)  have  the  necessary  leadership  and 
capacity  to  provide  their  citizens  and  employers  with  the  labour  market 
services they require. However, others feel that devolution has resulted in a 
governance  deficit.
12  Although  there  may  be  some  consultation  and 
negotiation between federal and provincial officials behind closed doors, it is 
federal executives in consultation with federal politicians who continue to 
make most of the central decisions. Post-devolution, there is no over-arching 
pan-Canadian framework collectively developed and agreed to that binds the 
 
 
12   Ian Dawkins, “Insuring Prosperity: SME Perspectives on the Employment Insurance System” Canadian 
Federation of Independent Business 2009, at http://www.cfib-fcei.ca/cfib-documents/rr3089.pdf. 
Advisory Panel on Labour Market Information, Working Together to Build a Better Labour Market 
Information System for Canada 2009, at http://www.imt-lmi.ca/eng/pdf/final_report_pdf-eng.pdf. 
Donna Wood and Tom Klassen, “Improving the Governance of Employment and Training Policy in 
Canada” paper prepared for the EI Task Force of the Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation 2011, at 
http://www.mowateitaskforce.ca/.  Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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whole together, or a public process that allows for input from federal and 
provincial  legislators,  stakeholders,  or  the  public  at  large.  Overlap  and 
duplication with respect to some programming (for example for youth and 
disabled persons) still exists. There are significant information gaps, parallel 
but separate fragmented universes, and non-user friendly information as each 
jurisdiction reports separately on its activities or, in many cases, does not 
report at all. 
2.2 The European Social Dimension  
Ever since the beginning of European integration, there has been a demand 
for a social dimension in order to ameliorate social or economic dislocation 
from the functioning of the internal market. The legal basis for Community 
action in employment policy was contained within the general objectives of 
the  Treaty  of  Rome,  which  included  provisions  to  promote  employment, 
improve living and working conditions, ensure equal pay for men and women, 
and facilitate the free movement of workers.
13 In 1957, the European Social 
Fund  (ESF)  was  established  to  provide  member  states  with  Community 
contributions for projects aimed at achieving these objectives.  
The completion of the internal market in the late 1990s coincided with a 
recession and rising unemployment in Europe. In 1993, the Commission under 
then President Jacques Delors developed and published an influential  White 
Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment.
14  Stimulated by this 
paper, the European Employment Strategy (EE S) began to take shape, and in 
1997 the objective of a high level of employment became a specific priority 
for  the  EU  and  a  separate  employment  chapter  was  included  in  the 
Amsterdam  Treaty.  As  member  states  came  to  realise  that  improving 
competitiveness while preserving the European welfare model might require 
common responses, they became willing to consider the use of ‘soft’ policy 
instruments such as voluntary coordinated action, exchange of best practices, 
benchmarking,  codes  of  conduct  and  comparative  analysis  to  promote 
convergence of their labour market policies. Member states saw substantial 
spillovers from one country to the other – if employment and social policies in 
one state got it wrong it could slow growth in the Union as a whole – and that 
dialogue could provide answers to problems that member states themselves 
might not have thought of.
15 
To  support  the  European  Employment  Strategy  the  ‘Open  Method  of 
Coordination’  (OMC)  was  developed  as  a  new  governance  technique.16 
Noteworthy is the selection of the words ‘open’ (not closed, allowing access) 
 
 
13   Raj Chari and Sylvia Kritzinger, Understanding EU Policy Making (Pluto Press, London, 2006) 
14   European Commission, “Growth, competitiveness, employment: The challenges and ways forward 
into the 21st century.” White paper COM (93)700. 
15   Donna Wood, “Ties that Bind: Comparing Modes of Governance in Employment Policy in Canada and 
the European Union”, in Laursen, Finn (ed), The EU and Federalism: Polities and Policies Compared, 
(Ashgate, UK and USA, 2011) 
16    There is no ‘one’ OMC in the European Union - it operates in different ways in different policy 
areas. Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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and ‘coordination' (to work or act together) to describe the approach ─ both 
British civil servants and European poverty officials interviewed took credit 
for the terminology and technique. The OMC is guided by the EU’s principle of 
subsidiarity: that action should be taken, wherever appropriate, at the lowest 
level  of  government  at  which  a  given  objective  can  be  achieved.  The 
employment OMC is the responsibility of employment ministers from all 27 
member  states,  who  meet  under  the  banner  of  the  Employment,  Social 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO). They are supported by 
officials  on  the  Employment  Committee  (EMCO),  as  well  as  the  European 
Commission and Eurostat. 
The OMC is a cyclical process in which mutually agreed objectives (political 
priorities) are first defined by EU Heads of State. Then the EPSCO Council set 
goals and guidelines as well as indicators that will be used to judge progress 
towards those goals. The European Commission provides support. Next, each 
member  state  determines  its  own  strategies  and  national  plans  to  attain 
these goals and translates these into individual, national social policy plans. 
Peer review takes place on the basis of national reform programmes that are 
prepared by each member state and document their efforts to meet the EU 
objectives. Through a mutual learning programme member states undertake 
research and allow for peer-review processes that may include study visits to 
member  states  focused  on  specific  problem  issues.  This  entire  process 
benefits from funding from the ESF, used by member states to implement 
specific programmes that match overall EU objectives. Other EU institutions 
and civil society actors have clearly defined ways to influence the process. 
Figure 2, adapted from Vanhercke,
17 illustrates the OMC cycle:  
Figure 2: The Open Method of Coordination process cycle 
 
 
17   Bart Vanhercke, “Benchmarking Social Protection and Social Inclusion Policies through the European 
OMC:  Panacea,  Failure  or  Good  Governance?”,  presentation  to  Europa  Policy  Workshop:  Using 
European Ideas to Open up Canadian Federalism, December 7, 2010 Edinburgh. Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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Compared  to  16  other  policy  areas,  Laffan  and  Shaw
18  assess  the 
institutionalization of coordination processes in employment policy thr ough 
the OMC as very strong. The degree to which the OMC has been effective in 
transforming the outcomes of member state employment policies has been 
studied extensively and there are mixed views on its impact.
19 However, there 
is general agreement that the   OMC has reframed employment policy from 
being strictly a national member state responsibility to now also include a 
complementary European dimension that is an improvement over the previous 
27 uncoordinated approaches.
20  
 
3. Comparing EU and Canadian Tools and Techniques for 
Coordination and Collaboration  
From the preliminary analysis offered above, it appears that the EU might 
offer approaches to reduce the governance deficit in employment policy in 
Canada. In order to gain a deeper understanding of how  the EU tools and 
techniques are used in practice, how this compares to Canadian practices, 
and the barriers that might exist to the transference of EU ideas to Canada, 
the following organizing framework (adapted from steps in the OMC process) 
has been adopted:  
1.  Strategic goals/common objectives/guidelines/indicators/targets 
2.  Monitoring, reporting and multilateral surveillance 
3.  Information exchange, research and mutual learning  
4.  Government actors and institutions and dialogue with social partners, 
experts and civil society 
5.  Conditional grants 
 
 
18   Laffan, Brigid, and Shaw, Colin, Classifying and Mapping OMC in Different Policy Areas. New Modes 
of  Governance  Project,  Reference  No.  02/D09,  Sixth  Framework  Programme  of  the  European 
Commission, 2005. 
19   Claudio Radaelli, “The Open Method of Coordination: a New Governance Architect for the European 
Union?”  Rapport  1,  Swedish  Institute  of  European  Policy  Studies  2003.  Kerstin  Jacobsson,  “Soft 
Regulation  and  the  Subtle  Transformation  of  States:  the  Case  of  EU  Employment  Policy”  14(4) 
Journal of European Social Policy 2004, 355-70. Caroline de la Porte and Patrizia Nanz, “The OMC: a 
Deliberative-Democratic  Mode  of  Governance?  The  Cases  of  Employment  and  Pensions”  11(2) 
Journal of European Public Policy 2004, 267-88. Caroline de la Porte and Philippe Pochet, “The 
European  Employment  Strategy:  Existing  Research  and  Remaining  Questions”  14(1)  Journal  of 
European  Social  Policy 2004 , 71-8. Susana Borras and Kerstin Jacobsson, “The Open Method of 
Coordination  and  New  Governance  Patterns  in  the  EU”  11(2)  Journal  of  European  Public  Policy 
2004, 185-208. Susana Borras and Greve Bent, “Concluding Remarks: New Method or Just Cheap 
Talk?”  11(2)  Journal  of  European  Public  Policy  2004,  329-36.  Diamond  Ashiagbor,  “Soft 
Harmonization:  The  Open  Method  of  Coordination  in  the  European  Employment  Strategy”  10(2) 
European Public Law 2004, 305-32. Jonathan Zeitlin, “Conclusion – the Open Method of Coordination 
in Action. Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities and Reform Strategy”, in Jonathan Zeitlin, and 
Philippe Pochet (eds.), The Open Method of Coordination in Action – the European Employment and 
Social Inclusion Strategies, (Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005). Kluve, Jochen et.al., Active Labour Market 
Policies in Europe, Performance and Perspectives, (Springer, New York, 2007). Charles F. Sabel, and 
Jonathan Zeitlin, “Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance 
in the EU” 14(3) European Law Journal 2008, 271-327. 
20   Kerstin  Jacobsson,  “Soft  Regulation  and  the  Subtle  Transformation  of  States:  the  Case  of  EU 
Employment Policy” 14(4) Journal of European Social Policy 2004, 355-70. Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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3.1 Strategic goals/ common 
objectives/guidelines/indicators/targets 
European Union  
All EU strategic directions have their origin at the European Council ─ that is 
from the heads of state of each of the 27 governments, the President of the 
European  Council,  and  the  President  of  the  European  Commission.  Their 
collective mutual desire to build a common market and to grow the union ─ 
both in terms of expanding membership and extending competence ─ is the 
energizing force behind the entire EU project. One respondent described the 
different roles in the EU as “The Commission proposes, the Council imposes”. 
This high level interaction provides a rallying point and driving force for all of 
the policy discourse in the EU. Regular contact between political leaders (at 
least four times a year) ensures a common understanding of the challenges 
they all face, an opportunity to work through different approaches, and a 
chance to build trust ties. 
It is also at the level of ‘summit’ meetings between Europe’s top political 
leaders  that  the  areas  of  EU-wide  policy  interest  are  identified,  including 
employment.  From  the  perspective  of  those interviewed for this research, 
employment is such a high priority as European citizens care strongly about 
unemployment  matters,  and  expect  all  their  governments  to  take  action, 
both on a pan-European basis and within each member state. Since Europe is 
operating  in  a  common  labour  market,  has  a  common  currency,  and  a 
common economic destiny, coordination and convergence in employment is 
of  key  importance.  One  respondent  described  the  OMC  as  providing  a 
framework ─ the right and left borders ─ to bind sovereign member states 
together without losing their autonomy over employment policy.  
Since the European Employment Strategy (EES) started in 1997, agreement 
between member states (assisted by the European Commission) on common 
objectives,  guidelines,  indicators  and  targets  has  been  the  key  motivating 
force that drives all activity. It provides the political direction necessary to 
keep  momentum  going  and  propel  forward  movement.  In  the  view  of 
Commission  and  member  state  officials,  the  approach  has  worked  well  as 
having objectives, guidelines, indicators and targets focuses policy-maker and 
politician minds. Townsend
21 suggests that when there are few incentives for 
recalcitrant players to move to action, hard targets act as a trigger that 
prompt political leaders to review their actions in the context of imminent 
threat of failure. “In this case the interesting question is not around whether 
the  goal  will  be  met,  but  rather  how  the  discourse  will  move  players  to 
action”
22.  
 
 
21   Thomas  Townsend,  Application  of  the  Open  Method  of  coordination  in 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial  Policy  Forum,  Government  of  Canada,  Mission  to  the  European 
Union, 2005, 13. 
22   Ibid. Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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In March 2010 Europe 2020 ─ a new strategy for jobs and growth − replaced 
the Lisbon Strategy as the EU’s overarching strategy. The EES is an integral 
part of Europe 2020. 
1.  Proposed  by  the  European  Commission,  Europe  2020‘s  five  headline 
targets  constitute  shared  objectives  to  guide  all  EU  actions.  Each 
member  state  is  expected  to  translate  these  into  their  national 
targets. Three relate directly to employment policy, including raising 
to 75% the employment rate of women and men aged 20-64; reducing 
the school drop-out rate to less than 10% and increasing the share of 
30-34 year olds having completed tertiary or equivalent education to at 
least 40%; and reducing poverty, by aiming to lift at least 20 million 
people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion. 
2.  Ten integrated EU-wide guidelines were adopted in July 2010 by the 
Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  Council  (ECOFIN)  ─  the  economic, 
finance and budget ministers in the member states. Guidelines 7-10 
specifically relate to employment policy. At their meeting in October 
2010 the EPSCO Council detailed how member states should use the 
guidelines, and what each heading means. 
3.  There are also seven flagship initiatives. Inclusive growth is intended to 
1) raise Europe’s employment rate 2) help people of all ages anticipate 
and  manage  change  through  investment  in  skills  and  training  3) 
modernize labour markets and welfare systems and 4) ensure all the 
benefits of growth reach all parts of the EU. In November 2010 the 
Commission released “An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European 
contribution  towards  full  employment”.  This  outlined  13  specific 
actions. 
4.  This work is initiated by the Commission and coordinated with member 
states  through  EMCO,  a  Treaty-based  Committee  of  officials  that 
reports  to  EPSCO.  The  indicators  for  achieving  the  guidelines  and 
targets are collectively agreed to on an annual basis. Data gathered 
through  the  indicators  is  all  publicly  available.  Officials  noted  that 
statistics are important as the knowledge base is of key significance. In 
2009  with  eight  guidelines,  there  were  72  indicators,  broken  into 
indicators  for  monitoring  and  indicators  for  analysis.  Detailed 
information on all of this is all available on the EES website.23 
5.  At a delivery level the EES guidelines are further operationalized on a 
pan-European  basis  through  the  network  of  the  Heads  of  Public 
Employment Services (HOPES) consisting of representatives from each 
member  state.  In  addition  to  the  guidelines,  the  heads  have  also 
developed  a  complementary  Public  Employment  Services  vision  for 
2020  that  nests  under  the  overall  Europe  2020  and  European 
Employment Strategy. 
 
 
 
23   See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=477&langId=en/  Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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Canada 
Although strategic priorities in Canada may from time-to-time be identified 
at a high, collective multilateral federal-provincial level, in recent years this 
has not occurred. With the failure of constitutional reform in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, most Canadian Prime Ministers and Premiers have preferred 
to  focus  on  non-constitutional,  low-key  administrative  approaches  to 
managing  the  federation.  Since  becoming  Prime  Minister  seven  years  ago, 
Stephen Harper has called only one First Ministers’ meeting, in January 2009. 
Post-devolution the only areas where First Ministers or Premiers have asked 
their Employment Ministers for collective deliverables relates to developing a 
common  framework  to  recognize  foreign  credentials  and  improving  labour 
mobility. Instead unilateral and bilateral approaches have prevailed.  
None  of  the  Canadian  officials  interviewed  in  the  late  2000s  for  this 
research saw a compelling need for an overarching and comprehensive pan-
Canadian federal-provincial employment strategy agreed to by both orders of 
government. In 2006 Premiers through the Council of the Federation (that is 
without  the  Government  of  Canada)  developed  and  released  a  strategy to 
improve  post-secondary  education  and  skills  training  in  Canada.  A  key 
conclusion was a need for additional federal investments. In 2006 and 2007 
the  Government  of  Canada  responded  by  investing  additional  funding  in 
provincial employment programmes. In 2009 Premiers hosted a best practices 
symposium  on  labour  force  participation.  Three  years  later  there  is  no 
evidence of any follow up on this interprovincial initiative.  
Multilateral federal-provincial activity in employment matters occurs only 
on defined issues, not on the system as a whole. These include labour market 
information,  labour  mobility,  the  Red  Seal  programme  (to  facilitate  the 
transferability of trade certification across Canada) and the recognition of 
foreign credentials. For example, a recent activity involved the 2009 release 
of a Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign 
Qualifications  as  a  public  commitment  by  Canadian  governments  of  their 
vision for improving qualification assessment and recognition practices.24    
All 14 governments in Canada are deeply involved in the employment policy 
domain, with most aspects governed by unilateral federal action followed by 
bilateral federal-provincial agreements. For example, the LMDAs were based 
on a public federal offer made to all provincial and territorial governments in 
1996. There are four key federal-provincial funding agreements25 governing 
different client groups: 
1.  Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDA) cover EI clients and 
also  outline  provincial  responsibilities  for  the  national  employment 
service. They are indeterminate in length and are in place in all 13 
jurisdictions.  
 
 
24   See http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/publications/fcr/pcf_folder/PDF/pcf.pdf.  
25   In Budget 2013 the federal government signalled that they wish to change the parameters of these 
agreements,  and  assume  more  control,  see  http://www.budget.gc.ca/2013/home-accueil-
eng.html. Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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2.  Labour  Market  Agreements  (LMA)  are  for  unemployed  people  not 
eligible  for  EI  benefits  and  low-skilled  employed  workers.  These 
agreements are scheduled to terminate in 2014. They are in place in all 
13 jurisdictions. 
3.  Labour  Market  Agreements  for  Persons  with  Disabilities  (LMAPD) 
provide  funding  for  employment  services  and  supports  for  disabled 
persons.  These  are  in  place  in  all  10  provinces,  but  none  of  the  3 
territories. 
4.  Targeted  Initiative  for  Older  Workers  (TIOW)  agreements  provide 
labour  market  adjustment  services  for  unemployed  older  workers. 
These agreements are due to expire in 2012, and as of 2010 are now in 
place in all jurisdictions. 
Some of these agreements are more significant than others. For example 
base funding for the LMDA is $1.94 b Cdn annually (€1.4b), LMAs $500 m Cdn 
(€359 m), LMAPD $218 m Cdn (€156 m) and TIOW $35 m Cdn (€25 m). Each 
order of government on its own determines its overall objectives/directions 
in employment policy, and then tries to incorporate these when negotiating 
the more defined federal-provincial agreements. From a federal perspective 
the objective of federal-provincial agreements is to achieve federal goals as 
required by their constitutional responsibilities or what they think Canadians 
want  from  their  federal  government;  to  ensure  a  measure  of  similarity  in 
programming  across  Canada;  and  to  reduce  spillover  effects  from  one 
province  to  another.  From  a  provincial  perspective  the  goal  is  to  secure 
federal money for provincial programming and priorities and reduce spillover 
effects,  while  at  the  same  time  protecting  and  promoting  provincial 
jurisdiction.  
Here is an example of how this works in practice. Every federal department 
is expected to develop a Report on Plans and Priorities. Human Resources and 
Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) ─ responsible for employment policy ─ 
has identified “a skilled, adaptable and inclusive labour force and an efficient 
labour market” as a key goal. Their plan contains five performance indicators 
as  well  as  defined  targets  for  this  broad  goal.  These  highlight 
federal/provincial/territorial  partnerships  (and  agreements)  as  essential  to 
the  Department’s  success.  The  LMA  is  identified  as  having  a  ‘robust 
accountability framework’ with ten performance indicators but no targets. In 
contrast  the  LMDA  portion  of  the  plan  identifies  three  performance 
indicators,  plus  pan-Canadian  targets.  Likewise  the  LMAPD  and  TIOW 
agreements each have their own accountability provisions, which may or may 
not include indicators and targets. All of these priorities, goals, targets and 
indicators  are  decided  in  the  final  analysis  by  the  Government  of  Canada 
through  the  bilateral  federal-provincial  negotiation  process.  Each  bilateral 
agreement  is  largely  similar  from  one  province  to  another,  with  some 
containing a ‘me too’ clause that allows for jurisdictions who sign early to 
receive equal treatment if jurisdictions that sign later get what is perceived 
as a better deal. However, there are significant differences between the four 
agreements, including accountability and co-financing provisions. Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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At the provincial level, each of the 13 provinces/territories develops its 
own  objectives,  indicators  and  targets  for  employment  policy  in  its 
jurisdiction. If federal money is on offer, a key objective is to secure this 
funding under conditions that meet provincial needs. For example, Alberta 
Employment  and  Immigration  (AEI)  have  outlined  their  strategic  labour 
market  directions  in  their  Skills  Investment  Policy  Framework  (2003)  and 
labour force strategy Building and Educating Tomorrow’s Workforce (BETW) 
(2006).  Their  key  goals  are  that  Alberta  is  able  to  meet  its  labour  force 
requirements and attract and retain workers. Given federal responsibility for 
immigrants  and  aboriginal  persons,  they  cannot  achieve  success  without 
cooperation with the Government of Canada. Through the business planning 
process Alberta sets 15 indicators and five overall outcomes, some of which 
correspond to the federal indicators.  
This segmented approach to programming leads to gaps and overlaps, and a 
degree of incoherence. For example, both orders of government are heavily 
vested in youth and disability programming. Provinces have asked the federal 
government  to  transfer  responsibility  to  them  for  these  remaining 
programmes  (Council  of  the  Federation  2012)  but  Ottawa  does  not  agree. 
HRSDC is also responsible for supporting Aboriginal Agreement holders who 
deliver the federal Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS) 
programme26  across  Canada.  Service  Canada  regional  offices  provide  the 
necessary support to implement ASETS programmes and services, despite the 
fact that it is provincial governments that now have the expertise in this 
area.  The  degree  to  which  aboriginal  programming  is  coordinated  with 
provincial programming varies from one jurisdiction to an other ─ there is no 
overall pan-Canadian strategy or attempt to coordinate between government 
and aboriginal organizations.  
3.2 Monitoring, reporting and multilateral surveillance 
European Union  
Ever  since  the  European  Employment  Strategy  was  implemented,  each 
member  state  has  been  expected  to  take  the  European-level  guidelines, 
indicators and targets, integrate these into national planning processes, and 
outline  how  this  is  to  be  done  in  a  document  called  a  National  Reform 
Programme  (NRP).  Each  member  state  is  expected  to  develop  this  in 
consultation with their national and regional social partners and then release 
it publicly.  
These NRP’s from each member state provide the basis for an annual EU-
wide  Joint  Employment  Report.  In  17  pages  the  2009  report  basically 
provided  a  high  level  summary  of  what  the  various  member  states  had 
 
 
26   The federal government has constitutional responsibility for Indians and land reserved for Indians. 
They directly manage over 80 employment service contracts with Aboriginal Agreement Holder 
organizations from across Canada. For more information see 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/employment/aboriginal_employment/strategy/index.shtml.  Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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accomplished in light of the key EES priorities, and some of the difficulties 
encountered.  It  suggests  a  way  forward  and  challenges  for  the  future.  In 
addition to this annual routine monitoring and reporting, evaluations of the 
European Employment Strategy have been undertaken from time to time ─ all 
of this material is available on the EES website.27 Each year for the past 22 
years  the  European  Commission  has  released  an  Employment  in  Europe 
report.  The  2010  report  highlighted  in  detail  the  impact  of  the  economic 
crisis on EU labour markets. 
Following  their  review  of  each  member  state  NRP,  the  European 
Commission develops country-specific recommendations that are agreed to by 
the EPSCO Ministers’ Council and then published. ‘Naming and shaming’ pits 
member  state  governments  and  their  administrations  against  the  EU 
institutions and is steadfastly resisted by member states concerned to avoid 
politically awkward criticism and perceived interference from ‘Brussels’. In 
the view of Begg, Erhel and Mortensen
28 the tendency to ‘blame avoidance’ 
weakens the system as a whole and this particular approach as an integration 
technique.  
While officials interviewed for this research agree that member states do 
not like targeted ‘naming and shaming’ and that they also find it hard to be 
constructively critical with each other, in their view multilateral surveillance 
is a very useful process. In fact, there is a desire to make it more hard-hitting 
in the future, in order to ensure that employment ministers retain control of 
the process and are not dominated by the EU economic ministers.  
Every  year  since  the  EES  started  officials  from  all  member  states  meet 
together  with  Commission  officials  in  a  two-day  multilateral  surveillance 
workshop  where  the  employment  programme  aspects  of  each  country’s 
National Reform Programme are discussed, defended and compared one to 
the other. It is through this process and the frank discussion that it generates 
that member states can foresee any recommendations for action that might 
be forthcoming. In some cases they welcome recommendations on where they 
should focus their efforts for improvement.  
Eurostat also monitors performance and compares member states with one 
another in regards to the EES indicators that they have all collectively agreed 
to. From time to time Eurostat will publish themed reports on specific issues, 
but otherwise all the data collected on the indicators is publicly available to 
any  European  citizen  or  stakeholder  group  that  wishes  to  access  it.  The 
indicators set by the Heads of the Public Employment Services are gathered 
through a special administrative system that they have collectively set up. 
The  entire  EU  OMC  process  is,  in  effect,  an  elaborate  benchmarking 
exercise,  given  that  it  covers  all  the  key  elements  of  the  benchmarking 
process: common objectives, guidelines, indicators, targets, data collection 
 
 
27   See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=en&moreDocuments=yes.  
28   Iain Begg, Christine Erhel and Jorgen Mortensen, “Medium Term Employment Challenges”, Centre 
for  European  Policy  Studies  Special  Report  2010,  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=en.  Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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and  reporting.  In  order  to  undertake  benchmarking  there  needs  to  be 
acceptance by the organizations being judged of the indicators that will be 
used, good statistical capacity to actually capture the data required (so that 
units  cannot  hide  behind  incomparable  statistics),  and  a  process  to 
institutionalize  the  entire  data  collection  and  reporting  process.  The 
interviews carried out for this project indicated general acceptance of all of 
these processes in the European Union, and a willingness to be compared to 
other member states, including the publication of ‘league tables’ that rank 
performance  on  specific  issues  from  best  to  worst.  Comparison  facilitates 
dialogue  and  fosters  improved  performance.  One  respondent  noted  that 
“extreme regionalism and an unwillingness to be compared is dangerous and 
counter-productive in the globalized world we now live in”. Academics are 
more  ambivalent,  suggesting  that  underperforming  member  states  are 
cautious and wary about the indicators selected and how the comparisons are 
presented.  
 
Canada 
In Canada each province is expected to develop an annual plan under the 
LMDA and LMA. Recently each provincial LMA plan has been consolidated on a 
HRSDC  managed  website29  such  that  a  search  of  13  different  provincial 
websites is no longer necessary. Unlike the European Union, the only pan -
Canadian report that is produced on employment policy is the annual  EI 
Monitoring and Assessment Report; however this provides little information 
on how services have changed under the LMDAs and cautions readers that 
interjurisdictional  comparisons  may  be  misleading  due  to  differences  in 
programming and labour market conditions. Dawkins noted that this report 
was “vague to the point of being useless”.
30 On the basis of this report he 
concluded  that  the  active  programmes  funded  by  the  EI  account  were 
“directly  causing  the  problem  which  they  seek  to  alleviate  by  taxing  job 
creation”. 
Since LMA agreements in Canada are bilateral between the Government of 
Canada and each provincial jurisdiction, reporting is also bilateral. On the 
HRSDC website one can now view each province’s report under the LMA and 
LMAPD  agreements;  however  the  reports  demonstrate  a  wide  variety  of 
reporting styles and do not provide adequate information to allow a reader to 
understand the programmes on a Canada-wide basis nor for comparisons to be 
made.  The  pan-Canadian  report  on  the  LMAs  that  HRSDC  committed  to 
release in October 2009 was finally released in August 2011. However, there is 
no comparative analysis. There are no reports at all on the Targeted Initiative 
for Older Workers. It is therefore very difficult for Canadians to determine 
the  results  achieved  for  the  almost  $2.8  b  Cdn  (€1.95)  provided  by  the 
 
 
29   See http://www.rhdcc-hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/employment/partnerships/lma/index.shtml.  
30   Ian Dawkins, “Insuring Prosperity: SME Perspectives on the Employment Insurance System” Canadian 
Federation of Independent Business 2009, at http://www.cfib-fcei.ca/cfib-documents/rr3089.pdf, 
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Government of Canada to provincial/territorial governments for employment 
programmes. 
There  is  also  limited  reporting  on  employment  programme  results  from 
Statistics  Canada.  The  one  exception  to  this  is  when  employment  policy 
touches  up  against  education  policy.  Since  1996,  in  cooperation  with 
Statistics  Canada,  provincial  Ministers  of  Education  have  reported  on 
Canada’s  and  each  province’s  performance  on  the  OECD’s  Indicators  of 
Educational Systems through the pan-Canadian Indicators Programme (PCEIP). 
This demonstrates that provincial governments can come together to develop 
common  indicators,  especially  when  a  lack  of  Canadian  participation  in 
international reporting might appear embarrassing overall. 
Other  than  these  education-related  matters  there  is  no  multilateral 
reporting  on  employment  policy  in  Canada  because,  unlike  the  European 
Union, there is no multilateral agreement on overall objectives, guidelines, 
indicators or targets that would allow multilateral surveillance and reporting 
to take place. For Canada, the idea of ‘naming and shaming’ is not on the 
table due to a lack of information and credible indicators that would allow 
judgements to be made. Officials interviewed for this research suggest that 
Canadian provinces do not like to be compared to each other, citing that the 
differences between them are so large that comparisons are meaningless.  
Some bilateral surveillance of provinces by the Government of Canada does 
occur  due  to  the  presence  of  the  defined  federal-provincial  agreements. 
However, there are no real sanctions.  Although the agreements state that 
federal  funding  will  be  withheld  from  provincial  governments  if  audited 
statements  are  not  provided,  evidence  of  sanctions  being  applied  against 
provinces  that  do  not  fulfil  the  terms  of  the  agreements  could  not  be 
identified.  
The reasons for this reluctance to report and compare are found in the 
very  nature  of  Canadian  federalism.  Provincial  willingness  to  collectively 
participate  in  pan-Canadian  projects  perceived  as  being  under  provincial 
jurisdiction is usually only possible if federal money is on offer. In that case a 
key balancing act is the trade-off between ‘light reporting’ (as desired by 
provinces in order to respect provincial autonomy) and accountability for the 
federal  dollars  being  transferred.  Graefe  and  Levesque
31  suggest  that 
provinces view transparent reporting as dangerous; by drawing attention to 
problems they could provide the federal government with a window for 
agenda-setting. Provincial governments have little taste for the production of 
one national report, further ensuring that little reporting is done at all and 
that what is done is done in such a way to make comparisons impossible. 
Graefe, Simmons and White
32 conclude that trying to enforce acco untability 
 
 
31   Peter  Graefe  and  Mario  Levesque,  “Accountability  and  Funding  as  Impediments  to  Social  Policy 
Innovation:  Lessons  from  the  Labour  Market  Agreements  for  Persons  with  Disabilities”  36(1) 
Canadian Public Policy 2010, 45-62. 
32   Peter  Graefe,  Julie  Simmons  and  Linda  White,  Understanding  and  Evaluating  New 
Intergovernmental  Accountability  Regimes:  Canada  in  Comparative  Perspective,  (University  of 
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through  public  reporting leads to minimalist compliance,  forms of gaming, 
and intergovernmental axe grinding. They urged governments to abandon the 
current  approach  and  turn  instead  to  institutions  and  processes  aimed 
specifically at innovation and policy learning. 
3.3 Information Exchange, Research and Mutual Learning 
European Union  
The  European  Union  has  put  extensive  processes  in  place  to  facilitate 
information exchange and mutual learning around the European Employment 
Strategy, and ensure that member states meet to discuss their programmes. 
Two of the key mechanisms are the European Employment Observatory (EEO) 
and the Mutual Learning Programme.  
Since 1996 the European Employment Observatory33 has been contributing 
to the EES by providing information, comparative research, and evaluation on 
employment  policies  and  labour  market  trends,  and  ensuring  that  this 
information  is  available  for  decision  making  to  EU  member  states,  the 
Commission, stakeholders and the public at large. Although started  by the 
member states, the EEO is now primarily a tool of the Commission. T he 
Commission uses consultants to provide the secretariat support to the EEO, 
and  in  2011  the  contract  was  held  by  GHK  Consulting  working  out  of 
Birmingham and Brussels. A renewal RFP was let in February 2013. 
GHK  provides  coordination  and  support  to  networks  of  independent 
thematic experts, independent national labour market experts (SYSDEM) from 
each member state, as well as officials from employment ministries and 
public  employmen t  services  throughout  the  EU.  GHK’s  tasks  include: 
coordinating the SYSDEM experts as they produce quarterly reports on labour 
market  activity  in  their  respective  member  state,  assess  their  respective 
National Reform Programme and undertake thematic reviews; coordinating 
policy  and  practice  reviews  and  thematic  seminars  for  Commission  staff; 
producing a monthly newsletter on current and relevant issues; and scanning 
the literature. They also facilitate the twice-yearly meetings of the European 
Employment  Research  Dialogue.  Although  some  of  the  work  of  the  EEO  is 
confidential  to  the  Commission,  most  activity  is  generally  available  and 
posted  on  the  EEO  website.34  For example, the website reviewed for this 
analysis  noted  seven  EEO  events  between  January  and  Jun e  2010  (with 
reports and speaker presentations available) as well as reviews of individual 
countries by SYSDEM experts, newsletters, quarterly reports and the results of 
thematic reviews. 
GHK  Consulting  also  supports  the  Mutual  Learning  Programme  (MLP), 
launched  at  the  beginning  of  2005  and  incorporating  the  Peer  Review 
Programme from 1999. MLP helps EU member states to learn from each 
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other’s experiences and enhances the transferability of good practice. It also 
encourages stakeholder dissemination of information about the EES and its 
implementation.  Every  year  six  Peer  Review  processes  are  organized  on  a 
specific topic hosted by a EU member state. Once selected, the review is 
advertised  to  all  other  member  states  which,  if  interested,  will  send  an 
expert  from  within  their  responsible  government  department  plus  an 
independent  expert.  The  second  part  of  the  MLP  is  twice-yearly  EU-wide 
Thematic  Review  Seminars  focusing  on  key  challenges  or  policy  priorities, 
involving  social  partners  and  civil  society.  All  of  these  MLP  activities  are 
funded by the European Commission. Full information is available on the MLP 
website.35 
In  addition  to  these  two  processes,  the  European  Commission’s  DG  of 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities funds other EU agencies 
that undertake research related to employment,  including EUROFOUND (to 
contribute to the planning and design of better living and working conditions 
in Europe) and CEDEFOP (to help promote and develop vocational education 
and training in Europe).36 The Commission also directly hosts other events  ─ 
most of them open to stakeholders ─ on a variety of issues. Presidents of the 
EU often host events to highlight EU activities during their six month term; 
for example in October 2010 the Belgium presidency hosted an event focused 
on the role of social partners in employment and poverty.  
There  are  also  a  wide  variety  of  networks.  For  example,  for academics 
there is RECWOWE (Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe), a Network of 
Excellence that brings together researchers from 29 partner universities and 
research  institutes  in  17  European  countries.37  Private providers also have 
their own separate network. Many meet up every year at  Employment Week, 
an annual exhibition for politicians, civil servants, business leaders, unions, 
civil  society,  regional  and  local  authorities,  academia  and  practitioners  to 
come together to discuss the major social and economic issues surrounding 
employment.  The  event  coincides  with  the  publishing  of  the Commission’s 
annual Employment in Europe report, providing a forum for discussion of the 
report.  
In  2005  Casey
38  argued that the peer review procedure in the EU had 
tended to be exclusive, involving a narrow ‘epistemic’ community and had 
had scarcely any impact on other actors believed to be key to the working of 
the  EES  ─  social  partners,  civil  society  organizations  and  sub-national 
governments. An academic consulted for this research agreed, suggesting that 
those involved were not necessarily representative of the policy community in 
member  states,  and  evidence  was  lacking  on  the  results  achieved  for  the 
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significant  investment  of  public  funds  in  the  European  Employment 
Observatory (EEO) and the Mutual Learning Programme (MLP).  
Writing in 2009 Zeitlin
39 drew a different conclusion. In his view mutual 
learning is one of the   most  widely  recognized  findings  about  the  OMC’s 
national  influence.  On  the  basis  of  the  interviews  undertaken  for  this 
research, many civil servants would agree with this latter perspective, citing 
the MLP as the most effective part of the OMC. In their view it is especially 
effective for smaller member states, providing an opportunity for them to see 
their problems in a broader perspective, reframing the debate and shifting 
the  policy  paradigm.  For  example,  before  the  EES  some  member  states 
focused just on unemployment, now the key issue is employment. They used 
to try and get older workers out of the labour market, now they are trying to 
keep them in. Before the EES many never considered integration of their tax 
and transfer systems. When asked whether the OECD did not already provide 
this perspective, respondents identified that OECD recommendations can be 
ignored, whereas Council recommendations cannot. As EU member states all 
work within the same EU institutional context, the OMC process permeates 
each member state to also include sub-national participants as well as non-
government  stakeholders.  This  does  not  necessarily  occur  through 
participation in OECD reviews.  
 
Canada  
On  a  pan-Canadian  basis  the  Forum  of  Labour  Market  Ministers  (FLMM)  is 
responsible for information exchange, research and mutual learning. As most 
of their activities occur out of public view, it is difficult to assess what they 
have accomplished. In 2002 Alberta hosted and organized a multi-stakeholder 
conference to review the experience with the LMDAs over the first five years
40 
(Lazar 2002). Since then ‘best practices’ workshops have been held in Victoria 
in  2007  and  Halifax  in  2009  on  selected  aspects  of  labour  market  policy; 
however both of these workshops were only open to government officials. The 
FLMM  Labour  Market  Information  working  group  has  hosted  four  forums 
related to labour market information ─ in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 ─ that 
were  open  to  external  stakeholders;  however  no  information  on  upcoming 
forums  is  available.  From  time  to  time  the  federal  Foreign  Credential 
Recognition  (FCRP)  programme  has  hosted  conferences  and  workshops  for 
provincial staff as well as larger stakeholder groups in order to develop and 
strengthen  Canada’s  foreign  qualification  capacity.  Federal  officials  also 
noted  that  sometimes  they  host  events  on  defined  subjects  and  invite 
provincial  government  staff  as well as experts and stakeholders.  However, 
there  is  no  defined  process  for  these  events  nor  is  the  information  about 
them made available except to those invited. 
 
 
39   Jonathan Zeitlin, “The Open Method of Coordination and Reform of National Social and Employment 
Policies”,  in  Martin  Heidenreich  and  Jonathan  Zeitlin  (eds.),  Changing  European  Employment 
Regimes and Welfare Regimes, (Routledge, London and New York, 2009). 
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Canada  does  participate  in  OECD  activities  and,  in  these  instances  the 
federal government solicits provincial participation on a project by project 
basis. For those provinces that are engaged, they are fully engaged. However, 
there is little sharing of overall OECD plans and priorities, nor are special 
efforts made to disseminate OECD results from other countries to provincial 
governments.  Other  than  the  pan-Canadian  educational  indicators  project, 
OECD  work  does  not  stimulate  extensive  federal-provincial  collaboration 
within  Canada,  nor  do  Canadian  provinces  engage  extensively  with  the 
international community. 
The federal government has also, on its own, tried to forge mutual learning 
processes  with  either  some  or  ad  hoc  provincial  government  involvement; 
however,  these  efforts  have  met  with  limited  success.  Until  2009,  the 
federally-funded  Work  and  Learning  Knowledge  Centre  of  the  Canadian 
Council on Learning (CCL) brought more than 90 organizations together in a 
consortium  focused  on  workplace  learning.  An  evaluation  of  the  CCL 
identified a lack of engagement by provincial and territorial governments in 
its  work  as  the  most  significant  challenge  to  its  long-term  success  (EKOS, 
2008). Many provinces, especially Québec and Alberta, refused to support the 
agency’s work, viewing a federally-funded agency on learning as an intrusion 
in provincial jurisdiction. Lack of coordination with provinces is no longer a 
problem since the CCL has since closed due to termination of federal funding. 
HRSDC  also  provides  funding  to  the  Canadian  Labour  Market  and  Skills 
Researcher Network, linking over 100 academics doing labour market policy 
research  across  Canada  with  each  other  and  federal  government 
departments.  However,  there  is  no  evidence  of  provincial  government 
engagement  in  their  work.  This  network  is,  however,  quite  active  with  a 
current  research  agenda,  working  papers  posted,  quarterly  newsletters, 
monthly research reports “Labour Market Matters”, and annual conferences. 
This information is all available on their website.41  
3.4 Actors, Institutions and Dialogue with Social 
Partners/Experts/Civil Society 
European Union  
Overseeing the OMC work in employment policy in the EU is the Employment, 
Social  Policy,  Health  and  Consumer  Affairs  Council  (EPSCO),  composed  of 
employment,  social  protection,  consumer  protection,  health  and  equal 
opportunities ministers from each member state. They usually meet around 
four  times  a  year.  The  Council  work  is  supported  by  the  Employment 
Committee (EMCO), a treaty based expert group made up of two civil servants 
per  member  state  as  well  as  the  European  Commission.  The  chair  of  the 
committee is always a member state official and the post is held for two 
years, aided by a support team from within the Commission. They meet up to 
nine times per year. Member state participation is at the Director level, with 
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individuals considered as leaders in the subject area from their country. They 
are  often  supported  by  subject  experts  from  their  country’s  permanent 
representative office in Brussels.  
Ministers  and  civil  servants  in  the  European  Union  are  expected  to  pay 
attention  to  the  European  Employment  Strategy,  and  their  constant 
engagement in the iterative processes of the OMC at both the European and 
national level provides the mechanism. Officials identified a close working 
relationship  between  EMCO  committee  members  and  EPSCO  ministers, 
moderated through their country’s permanent representative’s office located 
in Brussels. This reduces the need for detailed supervision of EMCO activities 
by more senior officials within their home Ministry. Although the European 
Commission may act in its own interests, it is held in check by a need for 
member  state  agreement  to  its  actions.  By  its  very  structure  and  lack  of 
capacity  to provide financial incentives it can provide the ‘honest broker’ 
role that the Government of Canada cannot. Regularity of contact between 
officials  and  Ministers  from  all  member  states  and  with  the  European 
Commission ensures that participants gain a strong sense of the problem to be 
solved  and  facilitates  coming  to  agreement  on  the  diagnostic.  The 
opportunity to debate ideas and see how the problems play out in different 
member states is a crucial part of the process of consensual convergence in 
the EU and building trust ties is key.   
Under EMCO there are two technical working committees, an ad hoc group 
plus  a  quantitative  indicators  group.  Funding  for  member  state  officials’ 
travel costs is covered by the Commission; however, member states pay for 
their officials’ time and accommodation. All attend on a regular basis; not 
only do they appreciate the opportunities for mutual learning they fear that if 
they do not attend decisions will be taken impacting their country without 
their involvement. Details on EPSCO ministers’ decisions and the operation of 
EMCO  (including  the  name  of  the  member  state  representative  on  the 
committee)  are  available  on  the  website  of  the  European  Commission's 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.42  
The EMCO committee publishes an annual work plan, and coordinates its 
work  across  sectors,  especially  with  the  EU  committees  responsible  for  
economic matters and social protection/social inclusion. S upporting EMCO in 
each member state is the Heads of Public Employme nt Services (HOPES) 
network. Their work involves one representative (or more) from each member 
state, supported by Commission officials. Essentially the HOPES network is 
the delivery wing of the European Employment Strategy while EMCO is the 
design wing. Since 1998 the Heads have met twice a year. Like EMCO they 
have an annual work programme.  
Despite the availability of Qualified Majority Voting in the EU, the ESPCO 
Council, the EMCO committee, and the HOPES network generally operate by 
consensus. If a member state strongly objects to a conclusion they will  table 
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an objection in Council. It is a nested process, with the workings of EMCO 
going to Council, with the exception of opinions that make suggestions on 
specific issues. Anything agreed unanimously in EMCO is generally endorsed by 
the Council. Commission officials note that with expansion of the EU to 27 
member  states  the  EMCO  committee  process  of  almost  60  members  has 
become more challenging. Being consensus driven has made the committee 
more cautious and often un-ambitious. At the Council level this often results 
in  language  such  as  “as  appropriate”,  as  well  as  footnotes  explaining 
particular member state circumstances or concerns.  
The European Parliament is expected to give an opinion on the guidelines 
underpinning  the  European  Employment  Strategy,  and  issues  an  annual 
progress  report.  With  the  Lisbon  Treaty  the  Parliament  has  gained  more 
influence,  but  is  still  not  an  influential  player  in  employment  matters. 
However, they cannot be ignored. There is also a structured process for the 
Council and the Commission to consult regularly with the Economic and Social 
Committee (a EU-wide advisory body representing employers, trade unions, 
farmers,  consumers  and  other  interest  groups  that  collectively  make  up 
‘organized  civil  society’)  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  (a  EU-wide 
advisory  body  composed  of  representatives  of  Europe’s  regional  and  local 
authorities). 
European social partners have a treaty-based mandate to be consulted on 
the  EES,  and  meet  with  EMCO  twice  a  year.  Four  groups  are  specifically 
named to represent business and labour43 on all EU matters. In 1998 and 2001, 
the EES Employment Guidelines called for the mobilization of all actors at 
regional and local levels, bringing civil society as well a s regional and local 
governments into the process. Civil society has a different status than the 
social partners and their views are organized through the Social Platform, an 
alliance of NGO’s active in the social sector.44 Civil society representatives 
believe  that  the  OMC  has  provided  them  with  a  ‘seat  at  the  table’  that 
governments  would  not  otherwise  have  offered.  Social  partners  and  civil 
society representatives have recently started to meet with EPSCO Ministers 
before  their  quarterly  meetings.  Financial  support  to  facilitate  this 
participation has now been subsumed under PROGRESS, the new Programme 
for Employment and Social Solidarity.
45  
Social  partners  and  civil  society  involvement  is  part  of  the  EU’s  long 
tradition  of  consulting  with  stakeholders  and  involving  them  as  experts  in 
policy-making.  Given  the  European  Commission’s  lack  of  capacity  to  act 
directly,  what  they  do  instead  is  consult.  In  fact,  wide  consultation  and 
dialogue  with  civil  society  is  now  a  duty  of  the  EU  institutions,  as  it  is 
expected  to  improve  the  quality  of  outcomes,  build  consensus,  and 
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strengthen  ownership  and  acceptance.  The  Commission  also  funds  the 
operational costs of 25 European umbrella organizations or networks working 
in a wide variety of fields, giving these actors a significant stake in the EU 
process. While academics may question whether this elaborate EU structure 
has resulted in improved policy making or increased legitimacy of the EU, 
none  of  the  member-state  officials  interviewed  questioned  the  value  of 
consultation with social partners and civil society, or EU-wide funds allocated 
to accomplish this. 
The European Commission has also established 40 European Sectoral Social 
Dialogue  Committees  in  key  sectors  (e.g.  transport,  energy,  agriculture, 
constructions  etc.).  These  are  expected  to  work  with  social  partner 
representatives  from  each  member  state  on  issues  such  as  occupational 
health & safety, vocational training, equal opportunities, mobility, working 
conditions etc. While EES functions more on a generic basis, social partners 
prefer activities at the sector level. Member state officials did not view the 
EU-wide Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees as influential. This reflects the 
reality that, despite the establishment of elaborate consultation processes, 
decision-making in the EU is still executive dominated. 
 
Canada 
The  Forum  of  Labour  Market  Ministers  (FLMM)  set  up  in  1983  and  then 
formalized in 1993 promotes inter-jurisdictional cooperation across Canada on 
a  wide  variety  of  labour  market  issues.  There  are  five  active  federal-
provincial  working  groups:  1)  labour  mobility  2)  foreign  qualification 
recognition 3) workforce development 4) effective employment services and 
5)  labour  market  information.  A  career  development  group  was  recently 
dissolved. Post-devolution there have been fewer Ministerial meetings, and 
until 2010 Ministers had not met since June 2003.  
The  FLMM  is co-chaired by the federal government and a lead province 
where the lead rotates every two years on an east-to-west basis. A modest, 
provincially-managed, secretariat provides support, with funding provided by 
contributions from the Government of Canada as well as from a levy on each 
provincial  government.  All  logistical  (travel,  accommodation  and  meeting 
room)  costs are funded by each jurisdiction and provincial representatives 
sometimes find themselves unable to attend meetings due to other provincial 
priorities  or  provincial  travel  freezes.  As  a  result,  much  of  the  work  is 
managed through teleconferences held among Senior Officials (at the level of 
Assistant Deputy Minister) 6-8 times per year. Decisions also require Deputy 
Ministers’  review  before  being  forwarded  to  Ministers.  Two  FLMM  working 
groups  maintain  websites,  and  an  overarching  FLMM  website  providing 
information on all activities has recently been launched.46 However, without 
the regularity of Ministers’ meetings there is no energizing force that propels 
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forward  movement  on  activities or makes deliberations available to public 
view.  
Given the lack of funding and turnover in provincial staff that provide the 
FLMM secretariat, it has been unable to develop strategic policy capacity on a 
pan-Canadian basis.
47 A key recommendation of the Advisory Panel on Labour 
Market Information (LMI) − set up by FLMM Ministers − was to adjust the FLMM 
governance  structure  by  including  an  enhanced  secretariat  and  a  renewed 
relationship with Statistics Canada and the Council of Ministers of Education 
Canada in order to enhance labour market information.
48 There has been  no 
government response to this report or subsequent action. 
Provinces  and  territories  have  developed  institutional  structures  to 
coordinate their work on education matters throug h the Council of Ministers 
of Education Canada (CMEC). In this case Ministers meet twice a year and 
their work is coor dinated by a permanent secretariat consisting of over 6 0 
staff located in Toronto.49 Over the years there have been many attempts by 
the federal government to transform CMEC into a federal -provincial forum or 
for  the  federal  government  to  have  a  more  formal ized  role;  however 
provinces have consistently rebuffed these efforts (Cameron 2005). It is often 
challenging for CMEC to coordinate their work with the FLMM given t hat the 
former is an interprovincial forum while the latter is federal-provincial.   
On a pan-Canadian basis there are few non-government players involved in 
employment policy that can bridge between federal -provincial governments. 
Many organizations that used to undertake research, provide expert advice, 
information and a bridge between policy -makers, stakeholders and citizens 
have closed, from the   Canadian Labour and Business Centre (in 2006) to 
Canadian Policy Research Networks (in 2009) to the Canadian Council on 
Learning (in 2010). Parliaments in Canada, either national or provincial, play 
a very limited role. There are no parliamentary or legislative committees that 
monitor federal-provincial activity, and federal committees responsible for 
subject areas (for example human resources) have no ability to tell provincial 
governments what to do. Their recommendations are hardly noticed. In the 
early days of EI reform the legislation required that the annual EI Monitoring 
and Assessment Report be tabled with Parliament; this has since changed so 
that now it is done at the discretion of the federal  Minister. Although it is 
publicly released every year as an accounting of the changes on a pan -
Canadian basis out of EI Reform; media coverage is non -existent. Without 
easy-to-use information on elements of Canada’s employment programmes, it 
is very difficult for non-government actors to engage with the sector. 
The FLMM is has not fostered linkages with business, labour, training and 
employment  agencies,  or  even  representatives  of  aboriginal  organizations 
that are now responsible for active labour market programmes for aboriginal 
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people  across  Canada under the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training 
Strategy (ASETS). When the federal government was fully in charge of active 
employment measures, it increased the involvement of business and industry 
by establishing the Canadian Labour Force Development Board in 1991 and a 
series of provincial boards. These corporatist boards were largely abandoned 
a few years later as the lack of peak labour and business organizations in 
Canada  (unlike  European  models  from  where  this  model  derived)  made  it 
impossible for the boards to reach consensus.
50  
In part, because of the failure of the national boards, the Government of 
Canada established national sector councils and related organizations. These 
bring  together  business,   labour  and  professional  groups to address skills 
development issues and implement solutions in key sectors of the economy − 
in 2011 there were 37 Sector Councils and related organizations in operation, 
funded by the federal government and coordinated through the the Alliance 
of  Sector  Councils  (TASC)51  out  of  Ottawa.  Since  Sector  Councils  have  no 
formal  linkages  with  either  the  FLMM  or  provincial  governments,  this 
significantly limits their legitimacy from a provincial perspective, as well as 
their  ability  to  facilitate  information  exchange  and  mutual  learning  on  a 
cross-Canada  basis.  Lack  of  connectedness  with  provinces  will  not  be  a 
problem for sector councils in the future, as starting in 2011, Ottawa began 
withdrawing federal funding support. 
The  Canada  Employment  Insurance  Commission  provides  a  means  for 
business  and  labour  to  directly  influence  EI  programme  policy.  The 
commission  has  four  members  ─  the  chairperson  and  vice-chairperson  are 
senior Government of Canada officials, while the other two Commissioners 
represent the interests of workers and employers.  Largely selected  by the 
federal government, since they are prohibited from holding any other office 
or  employment,  they  are,  in  effect,  full-time  civil  servants.  These  two 
representatives,  without  staff  or  other  resources,  have  to  date  played  a 
marginal role in EI policy-making.  
While there are many pan-Canadian as well as provincial organizations that 
express  an  interest  in  employment  and  training  issues  on  a  pan-Canadian 
basis, there is no ongoing or permanent institutional process or structure to 
mobilize them or even bring them together to share common interests. These 
groups  were  shut  out  of  the  initial  decision  to  offer  devolution  to  the 
provinces  and  many  initially  objected  to  what  was  characterized  as  the 
‘balkanization’  of  the  Canadian  labour  market;  however,  post-devolution 
their  views  have  become  muted.  Today  most  focus  their  attention  on 
individual  provincial  governments  which  now  substantially  control  the 
employment  system.  Each  province  decides  how it will receive input from 
non-government stakeholders and the  degree to which these processes are 
institutionalized. Some provinces (e.g. Québec, Newfoundland and Labrador, 
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Saskatchewan,  Manitoba  and  Ontario)  have  put  formal  advisory  boards  in 
place while in others more ad hoc arrangements prevail.  
3.5 Conditional Grants 
European Union  
The  European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  is  the  EU’s  main  financial  instrument  to 
support  structural  reforms  in  employment,  education  and  training 
programmes in EU member states. The ESF is one of the EU’s two structural 
funds52, set up in 1957 to reduce differences in prosperity and living standards 
across  EU  member  states.  It  originated  as  a  re -training  fund  for  human 
resources, training and educational activities, and social inclusion. Given its 
longevity, it has strong constituencies among be neficiaries, implementers, 
politicians and community service providers. Over the period 2007 -2013 75 
billion Euros (about  10.7b  €/14.4b  Cdn annually)  will be distributed to EU 
member  states  and  regions  to  achieve  ESF  goals.  Projects  are  targeted at 
groups  vulnerable  to  unemployment  and  social  exclusion.  Poorer  member 
states, including post-enlargement the newer member states, receive a larger 
share  in  relation  to  their  population  ─  over  three-quarters  of  the  funds 
available.
53  
In June 2010 the Commission and member states held broadly advertised 
consultations on future directions for the ESF. However ultimately the overa ll 
ESF strategy and budget  ─ as well as how it is distributed between member 
states  ─  is  negotiated  and  decided  between  the  EU  Member  States,  the 
European Parliament and the Commission at a high political level and is not 
the purview of the EPSCO Ministers or the EMCO Committee. EU funding for 
the ESF requires the approval of all of the member states. Once the budget 
has  been  established,  seven-year  Operational  Programmes  are  planned  by 
each member state together with the European Commission, spelled out in 
bilateral agreements between the Commission and each member state. The 
funds operate according to a series of EU-wide guidance documents (called 
Community  Strategic  guidelines),  and  legal  regulations,  adopted  in  2006. 
These are designed at the European level (with input from member states and 
civil society) and projects must be in line with the overall EU 2020 objectives.  
The ESF is implemented through a wide range of organizations within each 
member state, including national, regional and local authorities; educational 
and training institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations including 
the voluntary sector, social partners, industry and professional associations, 
and individual companies. The ESF is based on the principles of co-financing, 
shared management and partnership. Co-financing comes from member state 
or private financing and may vary between 50% and 85% of the total cost of 
interventions. The partnership principle means that each member state must 
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design and deliver ESF funds with their regional authorities, social partners 
and civil society organizations.  This European requirement has contributed 
significantly  to  the  maturation  of  local  and  regional  partnerships  on 
employment policy matters across Europe.  
The key actor in each member state is the managing authority ─ the body 
established  for  ensuring  the  roll-out  of  projects,  selection,  monitoring, 
evaluation,  reporting,  information  and  publicity.  Over  the  years  there  has 
been  a  shift  in  power  from  Brussels  to  the  member  state,  although  the 
Commission  still  plays  a  role  in  discussing  and  adjusting  member  state 
priorities.  In  practice  this  happens  through  a  system  of  ‘desk  officers’ 
responsible  for  a  cluster  of  countries.  They  follow  developments  in  each 
country  and  check  on  the  implementation  of  guidelines  and  regulations 
through bilateral meetings with member state managing authorities (Harvey 
2008).  Each  member  state  has  monitoring committees to provide strategic 
oversight  of  the  ESF  projects  and  check  that  the  programme’s  money  is 
allocated  and  spent  for  the  intended  purpose.  These  requirements  are  all 
detailed in the European regulations. 
Since social and employment policy is by and large a responsibility of each 
EU  member  state,  when  compared  to  the  spending  undertaken  on  social 
programmes  using  own  source  funds  (especially  in  those  member  states 
considered  as  net  contributors  to  the  EU),  the  ESF  plays  a    marginal, 
supportive  and  supplementary  role,  not  a  primary  one.  The  role  of  the 
European Union vs. that of the member states was described in Progress: the 
EU  programme  for  employment  and  social  solidarity  2007-2013  in  the 
following way: 
Member states have the main responsibility for employment and 
social  policy.  The  EU’s  role  is  to  be  a  catalyst  for  change  and 
modernization. The EU budget in this area compared to national 
welfare  budgets  reflects  this  balance.  For  example,  in  2003 
Germany’s social benefits expenditures alone totalled €489 billion. 
France spent €402 billion, Italy €281 billion and the UK €161 billion 
compared to the EU’s financial contribution of around €10 billion 
per year.
54 
This view was reinforced by many of those interviewed for this research. 
While useful, those from the more prosperous EU member states expressed 
the view that they would be willing to give over their share of the ESF to 
other member states more in need. However, in other member states the ESF 
plays  a  much  more  substantive  role.  For  example,  in  some  of  the  new 
member  states  (and  even  older  ones  like  Italy),  without  European funding 
their Public Employment Service would not exist at all.
55  
 
 
54   European Communities, Progress: the EU programme for employment and social solidarity 2007-
2013, (Brussels, 2007), 4 
55   Mariely  Lopez-Santana, “Understanding the Reallocation of Activation Powers in Western Europe 
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Canada 
In  contrast  to  the  European  Social  Fund,  the  $2.8  b  Cdn  (€1.95)  in 
Government of Canada funding provided annually to provinces and territories 
through the various labour market agreements is not considered marginal, but 
as absolutely necessary in order to provide employment support services in 
Canada.  Before  devolution  some  provincial  governments  in  Canada  played 
only a small role in employment policy, relying exclusively on federal action 
to provide employment services for their citizens. However, this varied from 
one  province  to  another.  For  example,  before  devolution  the  province  of 
Alberta offered career development and information services to all citizens, 
employment  services  to  social  assistance  recipients,  and  second-chance 
training  programmes  to  those  considered  as  disadvantaged  in  the  labour 
market. In contrast pre-LMDA the province of New Brunswick had very limited 
provincial infrastructure in place that provided employment programming or 
career services to New Brunswickers. Based on 2009/10 figures Wood (2010) 
estimated  that  federal  contributions  in  Alberta  represented  approximately 
50% of Alberta’s total active labour market expenditures. This contrasts with 
New Brunswick where the provincial pot of money for employment services is 
relatively small, and the federal contributions constitute over 85% of total 
employment programme funding.  
The  total  amount  of  funding  to  be  transferred  through  the  federal-
provincial  labour  market  agreements  (LMDAs/LMAs/LMAPDs/TIOW),  the 
distribution of money between provinces, and the funding formula for each 
agreement  are  all  determined  by  the  federal  government.  For  example, 
funding  for  the  LMDA  was  initially  allocated  to  jurisdictions  based  on  a 
standardized set of objective labour market variables, adjusted in relation to 
the overall impact of the 1996 EI reforms. LMA funding is distributed on a per-
capita basis. The new funding that was made available in response to the 
economic downturn was distributed based on the jurisdiction’s share of the 
unemployed.  In  neither  the  LMDA nor the LMA is a provincial contribution 
required. This contrasts with the Targeted Initiative for Older Workers and 
the Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities where provincial 
matching funds are required.  
Unlike in the European Union, what is noteworthy about all of this is that 
there is no formal multilateral federal-provincial negotiation process open for 
Canadians to see with regard to how much federal money is on offer, how 
these  funds  are  distributed  between  provinces,  and  the  accountability 
requirements provinces must fulfill in order to receive the federal funding. 
Indeed there is very little public information available on any part of this 
process,  and  determining  how  much  money  is  being  transferred  to  each 
province requires a detailed review of different press releases issued over 
various points in time and searching for the different types of agreements.  
In reviewing accountability provisions for the LMDAs and LMAs, on balance, 
Wood  (2010)  concluded  that  provincial  and  territorial  governments  had 
considerable flexibility in the actual management of federal labour market 
programmes.  The  key  restriction  comes  from  how  the  federal  money  is 
provided: that is, through defined funding envelopes with a requirement that Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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provinces account for each envelope separately without an ability to transfer 
funds from one envelope to another. The flexibility inherent in the current 
arrangements will likely change as a result of Budget 2013, where the federal 
government has started to be more prescriptive about how provinces are to 
use  the  federal  allocations.  The  Budget  also  highlighted  that  it  is  the 
Government of Canada that makes the rules according to their priorities and 
available funds, announcing that they wish to “repurpose” the federal labour 
market funding on offer and renegotiate the rules currently in place through 
the LMDA/LMA and LMAPD agreements. At the time of writing this working 
paper, it is unclear what will result from these negotiations. 
3.6. Summary Comparison of the European Union and Canada 
Clearly  Canada  and  the  EU  have  significantly  different  approaches  to 
governing employment policy in their territories. Table 1 below provides a 
high level summary of the analysis contained in Part 3 in order to allow easy 
comparison  and  facilitate  consideration  of  the  transferability  of  European 
governance ideas to Canada as outlined in Part 4.  Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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Table 1: Comparing Employment Policy Governance in Canada and the European Union 
 
Co-ordination Technique  Approach in European Union   Approach in Canada 
Strategic goals/common 
objectives/guidelines/ 
indicators/targets  
 
Employment considered as key priority area 
for EU-level action 
Nested, top-down driven multilateral 
process  
Component pieces collectively developed & 
agreed to  
Employment not considered as 
collective national priority 
Fragmented and primarily bilateral 
process  
Some negotiation, but primarily Ottawa 
proposes & provinces react  
Monitoring, reporting and 
multilateral surveillance  
 
Extensive public reporting on easy to find 
EU-level websites linked to individual 
member states 
Comprehensive and regular multilateral 
surveillance involving all member states 
Data comparing member states publicly 
available  
Limited reporting on pan-Canadian 
basis; requires search of each provincial 
site  
Some bilateral federal-provincial 
surveillance, no multilateral 
Interprovincial comparisons are rare; 
information lacking  
Information exchange, 
research and mutual 
learning  
 
Extensive pan-European coordination 
through third party organizations:  
European Employment Observatory and 
Mutual Learning Programme  
Conferences, academic networks and 
experts are part of a regularized, 
predictable exchange process  
Dedicated public websites, linked to 
Commission  
No third party organizations to support 
pan-Canadian information exchange, 
research and mutual learning 
                                                          
Ad hoc workshops held from time to 
time on selected subjects. Mostly 
federal and provincial officials only  
Limited joint F/P/T sites means less 
public information  
IGR networks and dialogue 
with social partners, 
experts and civil society 
 
Highly structured IGR process, with 
Ministers meeting quarterly and senior 
officials 10-11 times per year on a 
routinized basis  
Information available on public websites 
Consultation with social partners and civil 
society at both EU and member state level 
is a duty. There are highly structured 
processes to connect  
Other EU institutions (including legislators) 
have defined roles  
European Commission pays for civil society, 
social partners, experts and government 
officials to meet regularly and facilitate 
bridging 
40 EU-wide Sector Councils, mandated to 
connect with member states  
Ministers’ meetings are rare.             
Although officials interact regularly, 
business is mostly conducted out of 
public view  
Limited public information available 
Provinces and Ottawa consult as each 
decides. No process to consult on a pan-
Canadian basis.  
                                                       
Legislators have no defined role, even 
in reviewing agreements 
Governments rarely fund bridging 
activities for stakeholders; officials are 
often unable to meet due to provincial 
travel restraints 
37 Pan-Canadian sector councils; no 
defined provincial connections  
Conditional grants  
 
European funds supplemental to member 
state own resources  
Decisions taken jointly. Some stakeholder 
input; governments final decision-makers  
 
Parameters outlined in bilateral 
agreements; heavily monitored by 
European Commission  
Co-financing is embedded, long-standing 
requirement  
Devolved services could not run without 
four federal transfers  
Federal government decides on 
architecture & funding; no defined 
consultation process  
Parameters outlined in bilateral 
agreements;  lightly monitored by 
Government of Canada  
Co-financing only required for smaller 
agreements  
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4. Potential Transferability of European Ideas in Employment 
Policy to Canada  
The EU tools and techniques are now assessed in relation to whether it might 
be  possible  to  transfer  elements  to  the  Canadian  context.  In  that  regard, 
experiences with other social policy sectors in Canada, where relevant, are 
brought into the analysis. 
4.1 Strategic Goals/Common 
Objectives/Guidelines/Indicators/Targets 
Canada and the EU have distinctly different approaches to setting strategic 
goals, common objectives, guidelines, indicators and targets in employment 
policy.  In  the  EU,  since  employment  has  been  identified  as  an  area  for 
coordinated  community  action,  there  is  a  defined,  top-down,  organized 
multilateral process through the OMC, with each step cascading into the next 
that  then  triggers  participation  and  input  from  all  governments  and  other 
players connected to the process. The European Commission is responsible for 
orchestrating  all  of  this  action.  In  contrast  in  Canada  there  is  little 
multilateral action. When it does takes place, sometimes it is only among the 
provinces, leaving the federal government on the sidelines or asked to join in 
later  as  the  banker.  In  Canada  it  is  a  system  of  constant  mutual  ad  hoc 
adjustment, governed primarily by bilateral federal-provincial agreements, as 
opposed to coordinated and coherent multilateral action. 
Noel
56 notes the particular problems that Canada has had  ─ especially post 
Meech Lake and Charlottetown ─ in reforming its multilateral institutions and 
practices.  As  a  result,  bilateral  approaches  prevail.  Many  maintain  that 
bilateral arrangements can be more conducive to serious discussion, as only 
two  parties  are  at  the  table.  They  can  accommodate  different  provincial 
interests  and  circumstances.  Others,  however,  see  disadvantages.  Ottawa 
may derive a tactical advantage from a bilateral format, as it enhances their 
ability to set the agenda and then “divide and conquer”.
57 They may engender 
resentment, regional jealousies or claims of unfair privilege from those not 
party  to  the  arrangement.  They  can  also  result  in  a  more  decentralized 
nation,  with  substantially  different  programming  in  different  parts  of  the 
country, undermining a sense of national purpose and common interest.  
Given past experience, it is unlikely that employment policy in Canada in 
the  future  will  be  driven  by  First  Ministers,  that  the  current  bilateral 
approach will be transformed through broad-based multilateral agreement, or 
that national targets agreed to by all will be deemed necessary. However, 
 
 
56   Alain  Noel,  “Asymmetry  at  Work:  Québec’s  Distinct  Implementation  of  Programs  for  the 
Unemployed”,  paper  prepared  for  the  Mowat  Task  Force  on  Employment  Insurance  Author’s 
Workshop December 7, 2010, Toronto. 
57   Kenneth  McRoberts,  “Unilateralism,  Bilateralism  and  Multilateralism:  Approaches  to  Canadian 
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there  are  some  features  of  the  EU  approach  that  could  be  considered. 
Currently  the  arrangements  are  bilateral  within  a  Canada-wide  federal58 
framework. Canada could make the development of a renewed architecture 
governing  employment  policy  a  national  process  (i.e.  a  joint  federal -
provincial endeavour), or at a minimum provide an opportunity for provinces 
(and others, especially business, labour and aboriginal organizations) to have 
more  robust  input.  The  presence  of  four  separate  federal -provincial 
agreements for different client groups, each with its own distinct funding 
formula and accountability framework is not coherent. It is also challenging 
for provincial governments to manage.  
For the federal government to give over some of their authority in this area 
to  provincial  governments  would,  in  the  view  of  many,  not  be  in  the 
Government  of  Canada’s  best  interests.  A  successful  multilateral  process 
would require engagement from the province of Québec which, to date, has 
resisted such an approach not only in this particular policy area but in other 
areas. Likewise, other provinces would need to assess the advantages to be 
gained from a multilateral as opposed to a bilateral approach and the value 
of consolidating four agreements into one.  
4.2 Monitoring, Reporting and Multilateral Surveillance 
Although under the LMDA and LMA agreements each province is expected to 
develop,  share  and  release  their annual plans,  there is no requirement or 
expectation for these to be circulated among provincial governments, and no 
process like in the EU for provinces to review each other’s plans. The idea of 
provincial governments having responsibility to each other (including like in 
the EU making recommendations for changes in programming) is foreign to 
the  very  nature  of  Canadian  federalism.  As  a  result  the  EU  approach  to 
multilateral surveillance is highly unlikely in the Canadian context. Not only 
do provinces not want to be told what to do by the federal government, they 
do not want to be told what to do by each other.   
In Canada provincial governments do not feel a responsibility for promoting 
the interests of Canada as a whole; this responsibility seems to be born solely 
by the Government of Canada. Provincial governments view themselves first 
and  foremost  as  accountable  to  their  citizens,  not  to  the  wider  Canadian 
community.  However,  an  exception  has  already  been  noted  in  education, 
where  provincial  governments  ─   with  the  assistance  (but  not  direction)  of 
Statistics Canada - have successfully developed Canada-wide indicators and 
reporting  so  that  provinces  (and  Canada  as  a  whole)  can  be  compared 
internationally.  In Wallner’s view
59 the education sector demonstrates that 
pan-Canadian similarity can be achieved without the imposition of national 
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standards by the federal government through mutual voluntary cooperation 
among provincial governments. 
But employment policy cannot be coordinated on an interprovincial basis. 
Not  only  does  the  Government  of  Canada  have  ‘head  of  power’  exclusive 
constitutional authority for unemployment insurance, they also control most 
of the funding. The paper has noted unevenness in provincial reporting; a lack 
of interest in developing pan-Canadian reports; and an inability to compare 
outcomes from one province to another. While other policy areas in Canada 
(e.g.  health,  education  and  child  benefits)  may  experience  challenges  in 
reporting and comparing, there does not appear to be the same view  that 
programmes  cannot  fruitfully  be  compared.  Given  that  multilateral 
frameworks  exist  in  these  areas,  in  order  to  achieve  pan-Canadian 
comparative reporting, multilateral frameworks appear to be a pre-condition. 
Multilateral frameworks are essentially commitments to benchmarking. The 
Canadian  based  Forum  of  Federations  has  recently  undertaken  work  with 
Australia, Canada, Germany, the European Union, Switzerland, Spain, and the 
United States assessing the potential of using benchmarking as an alternative 
to controls tied to fiscal transfers.60 Not only is benchmarking being used in 
other  federations,  it  is  being  used  in  the  health  and  education  sectors  in 
Canada. 
Fenna
61  suggests  that  “collegial  benchmarking”,  with  the  central 
government  taking  on  a  role  in  facilitating  cooperation,  is  preferable  to 
coercive  top-down  approaches.  He  notes  the  challenges  that  exist  in 
generating  reliable  and  genuinely  indicative  data,  in  relating  outputs  to 
outcomes, and in identifying and incorporating practice improvements.  
There  do  not  seem  to  be  many  downsides  to  benchmarking  as  an 
alternative to detailed provincial reporting through the four current federal-
provincial agreements. For federal officials comparative data in a credible 
pan-Canadian  report  would  better  reflect  the  outcomes  achieved  from 
federal investments and improve the profile of the policy sector, including 
recognition of the Government of Canada’s role. For provincial officials being 
part  of  a  benchmarking  process  would  ensure  the  selection  of  indicators 
useful  for  their  own  internal  reporting,  as  well  as  reduce  the  need  for 
separate efforts on their part to report to Canada on the defined agreements. 
With  comparable  information  mutual  learning  would  increase,  leading  to 
improved performance. The key downside for all would be the time and effort 
required to develop and maintain the instruments, as well as a willingness to 
deal with fall-out when sub-standard performance on the part of individual 
provinces was exposed. Considerable political will would be required. 
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4.3 Information Exchange, Research and Mutual Learning  
The  European  Employment  Observatory  (EEO)  and  the  Mutual  Learning 
Programme (MLP) are the two key processes used in the EU for information 
exchange,  research  and  mutual  learning  among  the  27 EU  member states. 
‘Observatories’ seem to be more common in Europe than in Canada, providing 
an evidence base and a reference point for the collection of information on a 
particular topic. Their establishment is a result of the growing recognition 
that  policy  and  decisions  should  be  influenced  to  a  greater  degree  by 
evidence. They provide a role for ‘experts’ in the policy domain that does not 
occur to the same extent in Canada. Many of those interviewed noted  that 
these  type  of  organizations  have  proliferated  in  the  EU  as  a  result  of 
European Commission funding and their efforts to stake an enhanced role for 
themselves ─ if they cannot deliver programmes, then delivering knowledge 
is the next best thing. 
Over the past fifteen years these types of organizations have also taken 
root to some degree in Canada. The most notable example is the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information (CIHI), established in 1994 with a vision “to 
help  improve  Canada’s  health  system  and  the  well-being  of  Canadians  by 
being a leading source of unbiased, credible and comparable information that 
will  enable  health  leaders  to  make  better-informed  decisions”.
62  The 
Canadian Council on Learning (CCL) is another example. While CIHI continues, 
the CCL has been wound down. Yet gaps in information persist, as outlined by 
the Advisory Panel Report on Labour Market Information in 2009 and the 
OECD, which noted that in terms of post -secondary education Canada was 
unable to report figures for two -thirds of the information gathered by 39 
other countries.
63 Every sector considers the extent to which information for 
evidence-based learning is required. Dedicated pro cesses exist in the health 
and primary education sector in Canada in order to focus these efforts. Why is 
there a greater need for research  and information exchange in health and 
primary education, but not in labour marke t or post-secondary education  - 
areas of comparable significance to citizen well-being?  
Likewise  the  EU  Mutual  Learning  process  is  much  more  highly 
institutionalized in the EU than best practices learning in Canada. The volume 
of conferences and  workshops in  the European Union  -  with information 
available to the public through websites  - is vast in comparison to the more 
limited ad hoc activity undertaken in Canada, organized primarily by federal 
and provincial officials to foster learning among themselves. European policy-
makers and academics have identified the mutual learning process through 
the OMC as the most valuable aspect of the entire process, and have also 
noted  the  importance  of  involvement  beyond  the  executive  to  include 
independent policy experts and other stakeholders.  
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Looking to the EU for best practice learning ideas along the lines of the 
European  Employment  Observatory  and  the  Mutual  Learning  Programme 
would  significantly  enhance  information  exchange,  research  and  mutual 
learning in employment policy in Canada. Like in the EU this could be done 
through  the  creation  of  a  national  agency,  perhaps  called  the  Canadian 
Labour  Market  Observatory.  Responsibilities  could  include  identifying, 
maintaining and disseminating labour market information; data gathering and 
analysis  for  comparative  research  across  provinces;  sharing  best  practices 
across  jurisdictions;  monitoring  trends  and  policies  across  Canada  and 
internationally; evaluating labour market programme results (both Canadian 
and internationally), and comparative research.  
For  a  European-type  Employment  Observatory  or  Mutual  Learning 
Programme  to  be  established  in  Canada  it  would  need  to  be  a  joint, 
collaborative  undertaking,  not  a  unilateral  decision  of  the  Government  of 
Canada.  In  this  respect  the  governance  structure  of  any  research  or 
knowledge based institution is of key importance and here CIHI offers lessons, 
as provincial Deputy Ministers perform the Board of Directors role. But there 
are also lessons from the EU, especially the idea of using a private sector 
tendering process to provide secretariat services and organizational support, 
with  content  and  direction  provided  by  a  collaborative  intergovernmental 
process.  A  renewable  contract  would  also  ensure  that  the  responsible 
organization does not take over authority that governments wish to retain 
under their control.   
Another  key  consideration  in  enhancing  Canada’s  capacity  in  this  area 
would be in identifying how additional costs would be covered. In the EU this 
is clearly seen as a primary and legitimate role for the European Commission, 
given  that  member  states  agree  to  allocate  the  necessary  funds  to  the 
Commission  budget.  In  Canada,  there  would  be  no  obstacles  to  using  the 
federally-managed  EI  account  for  this  enhanced  information  exchange, 
research, and mutual learning role. The more significant problem would seem 
to be that, post-devolution, a process to fully clarify federal-provincial roles 
and responsibilities has not been undertaken.  
Again,  looking  to  the  EU  may  be  instructive,  especially  as  it  relates  to 
translating  the  EU  principle  of  subsidiarity  to  the  Canadian  context. 
Devolution acknowledged that provincial governments are best positioned to 
design  and  deliver  labour  market  programmes  in  Canada.  However  some 
issues are more efficiently accomplished on a pan-Canadian basis. Agreeing to 
assign  the  Government  of  Canada  a  revitalized  and  more  robust  role  in 
knowledge  exchange  and  mutual  learning  would  require  a  consolidated 
multilateral  discussion,  a  conversation  often  avoided  in  the  Canadian 
intergovernmental context.
64 A conversation is also needed about the residual 
role of the federal government in direct delivery, especially as it relates to 
youth programming.  
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4.4 Actors, Institutions and Dialogue with Social Partners, Experts 
ad Civil Society.  
Many  aspects  of  the  intergovernmental  institutional  structures  set  up  in 
Canada  and  the  EU  to  manage  government  to  government  interaction  in 
employment  policy  are  similar.  Yet  institutionalization  in  the  EU  is 
considerably greater. Information on all deliberations,  plans, outcomes and 
participants  in  the  sector  ─  from  officials  through  to  Ministers’  ─  can  be 
publicly tracked on a Commission website. This is connected to the related 
websites of the European Employment Observatory and the Mutual Learning 
Programme,  as  well as the larger Europe 2020 process.  In the EU there is 
considerable engagement of Ministers, whereas in Canada this occurs instead 
at  the  Senior  Official  and  Deputy  Minister  (DM)  level.  As  a  result  there  is 
considerably reduced transparency when Canada is compared to the EU. 
Greater involvement by Employment Ministers at the EU level is due to the 
fact that EU Heads of State are more involved in intergovernmental relations, 
as  compared  to  Canadian  First  Ministers.  In  Canada,  the  degree  to  which 
Ministers are involved varies from one sector to another, and the norm in 
health and education is at least one meeting per year, often two. There is no 
reason  why  meetings  between  FLMM  Ministers  could  not  occur  on  a  more 
regular  basis,  supported  by  a  more  robust  agenda  as  well  as  greater 
institutionalization of the entire FLMM. The forum remains largely as it was in 
1983 and reflection on its operation and role given the significant shifts in 
governance that have taken place post-devolution is timely.  
While there are many similarities between Canada and the EU with respect 
to  intergovernmental  processes  in  employment  policy,  there  are  stark 
differences in terms of actors involved beyond the executive. In the EU there 
are defined ways for the views of the EU Parliament and other institutions 
such as the Economic & Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
to be heard. One of the key governing principles of the EU is participation - 
EU  institutions  have  a  duty  to  consult  with  both  social  partners  and  civil 
society. Funded by the European Commission, there are extensive networks 
working on various aspects of employment policy in the EU, with information 
available to anyone interested in the topic through public websites.  
On  a  pan-Canadian  basis  the  employment  sector  has  one  of  the  least 
institutionalized processes for engaging with stakeholders - in fact, there is 
no  pan-Canadian  process  at  all.  Some  maintain  that  since  Canada  is 
comprised of 13 different labour markets, cross-Canada engagement is not 
required. The EU takes the exact opposite approach, believing that European 
member states form a single market of 500 million consumers and 20 million 
firms and that freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital 
across Europe is paramount.  
The engagement of actors beyond government executives is a key EU best 
practice that Canada should take note of. Another would be to create, like in 
the  EU,  a  defined  process  for  selected  groups  to  meet  with  Ministers  in 
advance of FLMM meetings. Indeed, there is no reason that both approaches Wood – European Governance Ideas in Canada 
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could  not  be  used,  significantly  improving  citizen  and  stakeholder 
participation in employment policy-making in Canada.  
An  interesting  point  of  comparison  relates  to  how  sector  councils  are 
governed  in  each  political  system.  The  pan-European  sector  councils  are 
deliberately  expected  to  coordinate  their  activities  with  member  state 
governments and sector councils within the member states (and indeed also 
at the sub-state level),65 whereas in Canada arrangements for the national 
sector councils to connect with provincial governments and provincial sector 
councils are ad hoc. Undertaking deliberate attempts to coordinate Canada’s 
federally-run  Sector  Council  programme  with  provincial  governments  and 
provincial  sector  councils  may  be  another  EU  area  of  best  practice  that 
Canada could learn from. However, the point is moot since it is unlikely that 
many  national  sector  councils  in  Canada  will  continue  to  exist  once  their 
federal funding disappears.  
How could any of this additional participation be funded? Like in the EU 
could travel funding for provincial officials to participate not come from a 
central  as  opposed  to  a  provincial  fund?  More  federal-provincial  meetings 
might be perceived by Canadian citizens as a waste of money on ‘junkets’ for 
civil servants and politicians. It would also require a greater commitment of 
time  and  staff  resources  for  what  is  often  disparaged  as  a  ‘talkfest’. 
Government  officials  would  also  say  that  a  more  inclusive  process  that 
involved stakeholders would make the process even more complicated than it 
already is, slow things down and take away their power and control.  
As a result of these considerations, many of the changes outlined in this 
section of the paper will not come from government officials but must come 
instead  from  those  not  currently  inside  the  decision-making  process  in 
Canada,  that  is  external  stakeholders.  This  includes  business,  labour, 
education  &  training  institutions,  private  employment  service  providers, 
municipal  governments,  aboriginal  organizations,  sector  councils, 
parliaments, and other civil society organizations. The benefit to them is an 
improved  capacity  for  their  views  on  employment  policy  in  Canada  to  be 
heard.  
4.5 Conditional Grants 
In both Canada and the EU to-day most employment programmes and services 
are  the  responsibility  of  the  constituent  units  (not  the  centre).  Spending 
allocations  by  the  centre  to  fund  employment  programmes  run  by  the 
constituent  units  play  a  much  larger  role  in  Canada  than  they  do  in  the 
European Union. Indeed, in Canada, this is the primary role played by the 
centre with respect to employment policy, in contrast to the coordination 
and exchange role which the European Commission plays in the sector. This 
difference is based on significantly different historical trajectories, including 
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the fact that pre-devolution employment services were funded and delivered 
primarily by the Government of Canada, with provincial governments playing 
a much smaller role. 
In both processes of coordination and collaboration are required. In the EU 
this action is through joint decision making, whereas in Canada it is through 
voluntary  negotiation.  Benz
66  suggests  that  voluntary  negotiation  almost 
always  requires  financial  incentives  for  governments  to  participate,  as 
without this stimulus their attitude is often ambivalent towards cooperation. 
Certainly this has been the case in Canada with respect to employment 
policy.    
In the EU under joint decision-making a collective process involving all the 
member states decides on the architecture that governs the ESF, the overall 
size of the transfer, as well as the formula for distributing the money. In 
making these decisions the EU also seeks input from those most impacted by 
the presence (or loss) funding, that is  programme recipients in each of the 
member states. In contrast in Canada it is the federal Cabinet that decides on 
the overall architecture for provincial transfers, how much money is to be 
allocated, and the allocation formula to be used.  
The key best practice that Cana da might learn from the EU in terms of 
funding transfers relates to making it a national, as opposed to a federal 
process.  Securing  input  from  provincial  governments,  as  well  as  other 
Canadian stakeholders would improve transparency and coherence, as well  as 
improve  how  Canada’s  labour  market  programmes  are  designed  and 
delivered. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Despite  the  significant  social,  political,  constitutional  and  institutional 
differences  between  Canada  and  the  European  Union,  this  analysis 
demonstrates  that  there  is  potential  for  Canada  to  build  on  the  current 
mostly  bilateral  relationship  in  employment  policy  to  also  incorporate  an 
enhanced  collaborative  multilateral  dimension.  There  is  learning  to  be 
considered not only from EU multilevel governance best practices, but also 
from  governance  best  practices  in  other  social  policy  areas  in  Canada, 
especially  from  the  health  and  education  sectors.  Current  multilateral 
governance practices in employment policy in Canada when compared to the 
EU are not transparent, open or participatory. Coherence, accountability and 
effectiveness  could  all  be  improved.  By  comparing  with  other  political 
systems  and  sectors,  policy-makers  can  think  about  their  practices  and 
identify  where  there  might  be  opportunities  to  improve.  Examining  the 
specific EU tools and techniques used in the Open Method of Coordination 
provides a useful mirror for assessing best practices in multilevel governance, 
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and a chance to reflect on what might and might not work in the Canadian 
employment policy context.  
Some will say that improving multilateral governance in employment policy 
in  Canada  is  not  necessary  as  what  is  important  is  the  governance  that 
happens within each province in terms of how employment programmes are 
delivered  to  provincial  citizens.  As  long  as  the  bilateral  federal-provincial 
arrangements  work  effectively,  investing  time  and  effort  in  multilateral 
collaboration is not necessary. But policy-makers from the European Union 
interviewed through this research ─ as well as the academics who write about 
it ─ believe that there is value to be added from complementary multilateral 
EU-wide action to support existing member state responsibilities.  
Canadian provinces and the Government of Canada are inextricably bound 
by geography, history and politics into a collective entity  ─ if “we are all 
paddling in the same canoe”67 consideration needs to be given to ways to 
improve  the  processes  and  practices  that  govern  their  interaction.  Post-
devolution Canada is not doing badly in managing these intergovernmental 
relationships,  but  could  do  better.  Nothing  builds  the  capacity  of  an 
intergovernmental  system  like  using  it  successfully.  Looking  to  the  EU  for 
ideas on new ways to collaborate provides a chance for setting a forward 
looking agenda that could ultimately result not only in better labour market 
outcomes,  but  also  improvements  to  one  small  part  of  Canada’s  often 
fractious federation.  
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